The San Antonio Express-News reports that the case of Vincent Seard, who has been found incompetent to stand trial as a result of his severe mental illness on three prior occasions, is now ready to proceed ("Slayings suspect ruled OK for trial," June 17, 2008). Serious questions about his mental status remain, however. Seard faces a possible death sentence for the 2003 murders of Terry Ingram and Patricia Kutzer.
Here's the article in full:
"At the fourth competency hearing since he was charged with capital murder in the 2003 beating deaths of two Kerr County residents, Vincent Seard was found mentally fit for trial Tuesday.
But testimony at the three-hour hearing before state District Judge Steve Ables showed schizophrenia and delusional thinking remain issues for the accused, who says he embodies all that is evil and good, looks to numerology to bolster his defense and calls himself 'Vincent Seard Jeffrey, period.'
Ables' ruling that Seard was competent provided little comfort to Cynthia Ingram, whose husband, Terry, and their friend, Patricia Kutzer, were brutally bludgeoned at Kutzer's farm outside Comfort on March 10, 2003.
'It's still going to be forever,' Ingram predicted after watching the hearing. 'It's going to go on and on. I don't think it's going to end.'
Seard, who was arrested in California four days after the killings, is unlikely to face trial before 2009, said District Attorney Bruce Curry.
The defense has previously said an electrical shock Seard suffered may have led to the Houston-area musician's bizarre behavior, including the unprovoked attack at the farm just off Interstate 10.
Defense lawyer Kurt Rudkin put little stock in expert medical testimony that Seard, 44, can meaningfully assist his defense and understands the charges and court proceedings, including the possibility of being sentenced to death.
He said much of his consultation with Seard during five years as his court-appointed counsel has concerned which spirits share his body and how various number patterns may factor into his defense.
Taking the stand Tuesday, Seard spoke slowly and clearly — but often in cryptic terms — about defense strategies, the reasons he left incriminating evidence at the crime scene, and 'Oren,' an 'entity from the sea' that shares his being.
'With clarity now, being as I am whoever I say I am, balancing in the ying and yang ... even to now I am Oren,' he said.
Asked about leaving his dog, photos of himself and his driver's license at Kutzer's home, Seard said, 'The reason was, as was left many articles, I then left evidence to see that whoever was guilty of the crime, charge me with it.'
Rudkin told Ables he heard little evidence Tuesday that differed from a 2006 hearing, the third and last one in which Seard was ruled incompetent.
Curry said Tuesday's hearing was the first in which experts agreed Seard was competent.
Seard's condition has improved because of drugs, but he may relapse into 'frenzies' — as has occurred before — if he halts his medication, testified psychiatrist Richard Coons.
Based on a three-hour interview last week, Coons said he concluded Seard's illness may affect his ability to consult with an attorney 'but not enough to make him incompetent.'
Dr. Michael Jumes, director of psychology at Kerrville State Hospital, said he examined Seard four times, most recently April 2, at North Texas Mental Hospital in Vernon.
'He displayed a factual and rational understanding across the range of questions I posed to him,' Jumes testified.
Questioned by Rudkin whether he thought Coons and Jumes were forthright in their assessments, Seard said, 'Who is to say what is normal?'
Seard's sister, Diane Stills of Houston, hardly recognized the defendant as her loving sibling of bygone days. 'He's not the Vincent I grew up with,' she said. 'Let's put it that way.'
***
Note: Judge Ables also presided over the capital murder trial of Scott Panetti and allowed him to represent himself.
Monday, June 30, 2008
Monday, June 23, 2008
Coverage of the Indiana v. Edwards Decision
The New York Times has this coverage of last week's U.S. Supreme Court decision in the case of Indiana v. Edwards ("Self-Representation by the Mentally Ill Is Curbed," June 20, 2008):
"A mentally ill defendant who is nonetheless competent to stand trial is not necessarily competent to dispense with a lawyer and represent himself, the Supreme Court ruled on Thursday.
The court said that judges could 'take realistic account of the particular defendant’s mental capacities' and, in the interest of achieving a fair trial, deny the constitutional right to self-representation that criminal defendants ordinarily enjoy.
The 7-to-2 decision overturned a ruling by the Indiana Supreme Court that had found that a schizophrenic man was entitled to a new trial on a charge of attempted murder because the trial judge had improperly denied his request to represent himself.
The defendant, Ahmad Edwards, who was sometimes quite coherent and at other times decidedly not so, had differed with his lawyer over defense strategy. He wanted to argue self-defense, while his lawyer wanted to present a defense based on lack of intent.
Mr. Edwards had fired a gun at a department store security officer after trying to steal a pair of shoes. He was found competent to stand trial after two psychiatric hospitalizations over three years after the shooting.
A landmark Supreme Court decision in 1975, Faretta v. California, established the right to self-representation as a basic constitutional right.
Writing for the majority on Thursday, Justice Stephen G. Breyer said the question in this case was answered neither by the Faretta decision, which did not involve a competency issue, nor by a subsequent decision that permitted a mentally ill defendant to waive the right to counsel and plead guilty.
Conducting a defense at trial without a lawyer’s help requires a higher degree of competence, Justice Breyer said.
Noting that the court has referred to the right to self-representation as an aspect of individual dignity, Justice Breyer said dignity was lacking in the 'spectacle that could well result' from a mentally ill defendant’s efforts, which he said were 'at least as likely to prove humiliating as ennobling.'
Justice Breyer said that rather than setting an all-encompassing definition of competency, the court would leave the decision to individual trial judges, who he said 'will often prove best able to make more fine-tuned mental capacity decisions, tailored to the individual circumstances of a particular defendant.'
Indiana had asked the court simply to overrule the Faretta decision, which Justice Breyer has criticized. But he said 'recent empirical research' indicated that the decision was not, in fact, leading to unfair trials when defendants were mentally competent.
The decision, Indiana v. Edwards, No. 07-208, drew a vigorous dissenting opinion from Justice Antonin Scalia, joined by Justice Clarence Thomas. Justice Scalia said the treatment Mr. Edwards received in being denied to present the defense of his choice 'seems to me the epitome of both actual and apparent unfairness.'
The only reason the court has previously accepted as valid for denying self-representation, Justice Scalia said, was a threat to the orderliness ofthe trial. But Mr. Edwards was 'respectful and compliant' and did not even have the chance to try representing himself, Justice Scalia continued, adding, 'The dignity at issue is the supreme human dignity of being master of one’s fate rather than a ward of the state — the dignity of individual choice.'
Justice Scalia said that 'trial judges will have every incentive to make their lives easier' by appointing lawyers rather than giving mentally ill defendantsa chance to proceed on their own.
'In singling out mentally ill defendants for this treatment,' he said, 'the court’s opinion does not even have the questionable virtue of being politically correct.'"
And here's an excerpt from an analysis provided by Lyle Denniston, with scotusblog ("Faretta survives, with limits," June 19, 2008):
"The Edwards opinion by Breyer, in dealing with mentally ill individuals who voice a desired to be their own defense counsel, provides one clear implication, and one quite unclear prospect.
It is clear, simply from the result, that states may now have one standard of mentally competency for putting a mentally impaired person on trial, and a higher standard that such a person would have to meet in order to be allowed self-representation. Ahmad Edwards had been found competent to be put on trial, but not to represent himself.
What is unclear, though, is what the higher standard is for representing one’s self when mental competency is at issue. The Court expressly rejected a proposal by the state of Indiana that self-representation be denied whenever the accused 'cannot communicate coherently with the court or a jury.' The state had suggested that approach, saying it 'fits Sixth Amendment doctrine, which allows some balancing of interests when defendants attempt self-representation.'
In fact, the state argued, if the Court did not adopt some such standard, that would be a reason to cast Faretta aside.
The Court said no to that approach: 'We are sufficiently uncertain…as to how that particular standard would work in practice to refrain from endorsing it as a federal constitutional standard here. We need not now, and we do not, adopt it.'
To which Scalia replied in dissent: 'Today’s holding is extraordinarily vague. The Court does not accept Indiana’s position that self-representation can be denied ‘where the defendant cannot communicate coherently with the court or a jury.'…It does not even hold that Edwards was properly denied his right to represent himself. It holds only that lack of mental competence can under some circumstances form a basis for denying the right to proceed pro se…We will probably give some meaning to this holding in the future, but the indeterminancy makes a bad holding worse.'
In other words, there will have to be sequels. In the meantime, states can experiment with various formulations of a standard — so long as it is not theone Indiana suggested."
***
Additional coverage is available in The Washington Post and the Legal Times, and from the Associated Press.
"A mentally ill defendant who is nonetheless competent to stand trial is not necessarily competent to dispense with a lawyer and represent himself, the Supreme Court ruled on Thursday.
The court said that judges could 'take realistic account of the particular defendant’s mental capacities' and, in the interest of achieving a fair trial, deny the constitutional right to self-representation that criminal defendants ordinarily enjoy.
The 7-to-2 decision overturned a ruling by the Indiana Supreme Court that had found that a schizophrenic man was entitled to a new trial on a charge of attempted murder because the trial judge had improperly denied his request to represent himself.
The defendant, Ahmad Edwards, who was sometimes quite coherent and at other times decidedly not so, had differed with his lawyer over defense strategy. He wanted to argue self-defense, while his lawyer wanted to present a defense based on lack of intent.
Mr. Edwards had fired a gun at a department store security officer after trying to steal a pair of shoes. He was found competent to stand trial after two psychiatric hospitalizations over three years after the shooting.
A landmark Supreme Court decision in 1975, Faretta v. California, established the right to self-representation as a basic constitutional right.
Writing for the majority on Thursday, Justice Stephen G. Breyer said the question in this case was answered neither by the Faretta decision, which did not involve a competency issue, nor by a subsequent decision that permitted a mentally ill defendant to waive the right to counsel and plead guilty.
Conducting a defense at trial without a lawyer’s help requires a higher degree of competence, Justice Breyer said.
Noting that the court has referred to the right to self-representation as an aspect of individual dignity, Justice Breyer said dignity was lacking in the 'spectacle that could well result' from a mentally ill defendant’s efforts, which he said were 'at least as likely to prove humiliating as ennobling.'
Justice Breyer said that rather than setting an all-encompassing definition of competency, the court would leave the decision to individual trial judges, who he said 'will often prove best able to make more fine-tuned mental capacity decisions, tailored to the individual circumstances of a particular defendant.'
Indiana had asked the court simply to overrule the Faretta decision, which Justice Breyer has criticized. But he said 'recent empirical research' indicated that the decision was not, in fact, leading to unfair trials when defendants were mentally competent.
The decision, Indiana v. Edwards, No. 07-208, drew a vigorous dissenting opinion from Justice Antonin Scalia, joined by Justice Clarence Thomas. Justice Scalia said the treatment Mr. Edwards received in being denied to present the defense of his choice 'seems to me the epitome of both actual and apparent unfairness.'
The only reason the court has previously accepted as valid for denying self-representation, Justice Scalia said, was a threat to the orderliness ofthe trial. But Mr. Edwards was 'respectful and compliant' and did not even have the chance to try representing himself, Justice Scalia continued, adding, 'The dignity at issue is the supreme human dignity of being master of one’s fate rather than a ward of the state — the dignity of individual choice.'
Justice Scalia said that 'trial judges will have every incentive to make their lives easier' by appointing lawyers rather than giving mentally ill defendantsa chance to proceed on their own.
'In singling out mentally ill defendants for this treatment,' he said, 'the court’s opinion does not even have the questionable virtue of being politically correct.'"
And here's an excerpt from an analysis provided by Lyle Denniston, with scotusblog ("Faretta survives, with limits," June 19, 2008):
"The Edwards opinion by Breyer, in dealing with mentally ill individuals who voice a desired to be their own defense counsel, provides one clear implication, and one quite unclear prospect.
It is clear, simply from the result, that states may now have one standard of mentally competency for putting a mentally impaired person on trial, and a higher standard that such a person would have to meet in order to be allowed self-representation. Ahmad Edwards had been found competent to be put on trial, but not to represent himself.
What is unclear, though, is what the higher standard is for representing one’s self when mental competency is at issue. The Court expressly rejected a proposal by the state of Indiana that self-representation be denied whenever the accused 'cannot communicate coherently with the court or a jury.' The state had suggested that approach, saying it 'fits Sixth Amendment doctrine, which allows some balancing of interests when defendants attempt self-representation.'
In fact, the state argued, if the Court did not adopt some such standard, that would be a reason to cast Faretta aside.
The Court said no to that approach: 'We are sufficiently uncertain…as to how that particular standard would work in practice to refrain from endorsing it as a federal constitutional standard here. We need not now, and we do not, adopt it.'
To which Scalia replied in dissent: 'Today’s holding is extraordinarily vague. The Court does not accept Indiana’s position that self-representation can be denied ‘where the defendant cannot communicate coherently with the court or a jury.'…It does not even hold that Edwards was properly denied his right to represent himself. It holds only that lack of mental competence can under some circumstances form a basis for denying the right to proceed pro se…We will probably give some meaning to this holding in the future, but the indeterminancy makes a bad holding worse.'
In other words, there will have to be sequels. In the meantime, states can experiment with various formulations of a standard — so long as it is not theone Indiana suggested."
***
Additional coverage is available in The Washington Post and the Legal Times, and from the Associated Press.
Thursday, June 19, 2008
U.S. Supreme Court Places Limits on Self-Representation
The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled in Indiana v. Edwards that defendants with severe mental illness who are found competent to stand trial do not necessarily have the right to represent themselves. The Court heard arguments in the case earlier this spring.
Here's a quick summary from Associated Press reporter Mark Sherman ("Court puts limits on mentally ill defendants," June 19, 2008):
"The Supreme Court ruled Thursday that criminal defendants with a history of mental illness do not always have the right to represent themselves, even if they have been judged competent to stand trial.
The justices, by a 7-2 vote, said states can give trial judges discretion to prevent someone from acting as his own lawyer if they are concerned that the trial could turn into a farce.
The decision comes in the case of an Indiana man who was convicted of attempted murder and other charges in 2005 for a shooting six years earlier at an Indianapolis department store.
Ahmad Edwards was initially found to be schizophrenic and suffering from delusions and spent most of the five years after the shooting in state psychiatric facilities. But by 2005, he was judged competent to stand trial.
Edwards asked to represent himself. A judge denied the request because he was concerned that Edwards' trial would not be fair. Edwards, represented by a lawyer, was convicted anyway and sentenced to 30 years in prison.
He appealed, and Indiana courts agreed that his right to represent himself had been violated, citing a U.S. high court decision from 1993. The courts overturned his conviction and ordered a new trial.
Thursday's ruling probably will lead to the reinstatement of the conviction.
'The Constitution permits states to insist upon representation by counsel for those competent enough to stand trial ... but who still suffer from severe mental illness to the point where they are not competent to conduct trial proceedings by themselves,' Justice Stephen Breyer wrote in the majority opinion.
Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas dissented. 'In my view, the Constitution does not permit a state to substitute its own perception of fairness for the defendant's right to make his own case before the jury,' Scalia said.
***
The opinion is available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/opinions/07pdf/07-208.pdf.
Earlier coverage of Indiana v. Edwards is available here, here, here, and here.
Here's a quick summary from Associated Press reporter Mark Sherman ("Court puts limits on mentally ill defendants," June 19, 2008):
"The Supreme Court ruled Thursday that criminal defendants with a history of mental illness do not always have the right to represent themselves, even if they have been judged competent to stand trial.
The justices, by a 7-2 vote, said states can give trial judges discretion to prevent someone from acting as his own lawyer if they are concerned that the trial could turn into a farce.
The decision comes in the case of an Indiana man who was convicted of attempted murder and other charges in 2005 for a shooting six years earlier at an Indianapolis department store.
Ahmad Edwards was initially found to be schizophrenic and suffering from delusions and spent most of the five years after the shooting in state psychiatric facilities. But by 2005, he was judged competent to stand trial.
Edwards asked to represent himself. A judge denied the request because he was concerned that Edwards' trial would not be fair. Edwards, represented by a lawyer, was convicted anyway and sentenced to 30 years in prison.
He appealed, and Indiana courts agreed that his right to represent himself had been violated, citing a U.S. high court decision from 1993. The courts overturned his conviction and ordered a new trial.
Thursday's ruling probably will lead to the reinstatement of the conviction.
'The Constitution permits states to insist upon representation by counsel for those competent enough to stand trial ... but who still suffer from severe mental illness to the point where they are not competent to conduct trial proceedings by themselves,' Justice Stephen Breyer wrote in the majority opinion.
Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas dissented. 'In my view, the Constitution does not permit a state to substitute its own perception of fairness for the defendant's right to make his own case before the jury,' Scalia said.
***
The opinion is available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/opinions/07pdf/07-208.pdf.
Earlier coverage of Indiana v. Edwards is available here, here, here, and here.
Wednesday, June 18, 2008
More on Scott Panetti
From the Houston Chronicle ("Austin judge finds inmate sane enough for execution; More appeals are likely in the landmark case," June 17, 2008):
For 15 years, Scott Panetti has been Example No. 1 of the problems that result when mental illness crosses paths with the criminal justice system.
They were evident at his capital murder trial, when he represented himself and dressed up in a purple cowboy suit, making a bad joke of sober proceedings when he subpoenaed JFK and Jesus Christ. And they were just as apparent years later when the state tried to execute Panetti, only to see appeals courts step in and grapple with the question of whether he was too crazy to kill.
Now an Austin federal judge has decided that Panetti, convicted by a Kerr County jury of killing his in-laws in 1992, may not be quite as sick as advertised and likely has tried to manipulate doctors assigned to investigate his mental state.
U.S. District Judge Sam Sparks, who conducted a hearing on Panetti's sanity in February, concluded that he does not deserve the protection of the courts — at least not in his current state.
"If any mentally ill person is competent to be executed for his crime, this record establishes it is Scott Panetti," Sparks concluded in his 62-page opinion.
A year ago, Panetti's lawyers were celebrating a decision by the U.S. Supreme Court that declared Texas' standard for deciding competency for execution was so narrow as to be almost meaningless.
Expanding on its 1986 ruling in Ford v. Wainwright, which made it unlawful to execute the incompetent, the high court said a defendant had to have a "rational understanding" of why he was going to be put to death.
Panetti's lead counsel, Greg Wiercioch, all but said his death row days were numbered.
"Today the Supreme Court recognized that executing Scott Panetti would be a mindless, meaningless and miserable spectacle," Wiercioch said.
His assumption was that any court ordered to review Panetti's case in light of the Supreme Court's ruling — which required that defendants have more than just a technical understanding why they were being put to death — would see how sick he is and spare him the needle.
Malingering suspected
Sparks, however, did nothing of the sort.
While acknowledging that Panetti is seriously mentally ill, Sparks, however, seized on the opinion of three doctors hired by the state who suspected malingering and found behavior inconsistent with previous diagnoses of schizophrenia and schizoaffective disorder.
Sparks was also persuaded by tape recordings of conversations between Panetti and his parents. They indicate he had a good grasp of his legal case, and that he had adjusted his attitude and his level of cooperation with doctors depending on which side was paying them.
To Sparks, Panetti's words suggested a rational appreciation of his predicament.
"It is not seriously disputable that Panetti suffers from paranoid delusions of some type, and these delusions may well have contributed to his murder of Joe and Amanda Alvarado," Sparks wrote. "However, it is equally apparent from his recorded conversations with his parents that these delusions do not prevent him from having both a factual and rational understanding that he committed those murders, was tried and convicted, and is sentenced to die for them."
Wiercioch said Sparks essentially ignored 30 years of medical evidence and relied on a small amount of recorded conversation that did not mean anything when viewed in light of Panetti's system of delusions.
Wiercioch insists Sparks missed the point of the Supreme Court's decision: A condemned inmate's competency has to be considered in light of his broader understanding of the crime, why he committed it and why he is being punished for it.
Careful examination
In its review of the Panetti case, the Supreme Court acknowledged that "rational understanding" is a difficult concept to define. It also pointed out that some offenders might be so callous, unrepentant or lacking in compassion that they might seem out of touch with reality, which does not mean they cannot be executed.
But the high court said that defendants who are seriously mentally ill need to be carefully examined to see that what they believe and understand has some connection to the truth.
"Gross delusions stemming from a severe mental disorder may put an awareness of a link between crime and its punishment in a context so far removed from reality that the punishment can serve no proper purpose," the majority opinion stated. "A prisoner's awareness of the State's rationale for an execution is not the same as a rational understanding of it."
Sparks' opinion took a limited view of what that means. Panetti's illness and belief system are largely irrelevant now if he can talk reasonably about his appeals and understands he is engaged in an adversarial process that could end with his execution, the judge said.
Understanding matters
Under Sparks' interpretation, even the most bizarre delusional system would matter little — say, Panetti believing he killed his in-laws because he had been anointed by God to stop an alien invasion of Earth — because the only matter relevant for execution competency would be a rational understanding of the legal process involved in obtaining it.
"The tapes of Panetti's conversations with his parents establish that Panetti has a fairly sophisticated understanding of his case, up to and including the legal intricacies presented by Ford and the Supreme Court's remand opinion," Sparks wrote.
Sparks also wrote that Panetti's unwillingness to engage mental health experts equally regardless of which side was employing them also worked against the claim that he is too ill to understand what is going on.
"This suggests nothing more exotic than a rational understanding that Panetti's legal defense is an adversarial process and the State is on the other side," the judge stated.
The case will be appealed and ultimately could end up back with the Supreme Court for justices to determine whether Sparks followed the intent of their previous ruling.
For 15 years, Scott Panetti has been Example No. 1 of the problems that result when mental illness crosses paths with the criminal justice system.
They were evident at his capital murder trial, when he represented himself and dressed up in a purple cowboy suit, making a bad joke of sober proceedings when he subpoenaed JFK and Jesus Christ. And they were just as apparent years later when the state tried to execute Panetti, only to see appeals courts step in and grapple with the question of whether he was too crazy to kill.
Now an Austin federal judge has decided that Panetti, convicted by a Kerr County jury of killing his in-laws in 1992, may not be quite as sick as advertised and likely has tried to manipulate doctors assigned to investigate his mental state.
U.S. District Judge Sam Sparks, who conducted a hearing on Panetti's sanity in February, concluded that he does not deserve the protection of the courts — at least not in his current state.
"If any mentally ill person is competent to be executed for his crime, this record establishes it is Scott Panetti," Sparks concluded in his 62-page opinion.
A year ago, Panetti's lawyers were celebrating a decision by the U.S. Supreme Court that declared Texas' standard for deciding competency for execution was so narrow as to be almost meaningless.
Expanding on its 1986 ruling in Ford v. Wainwright, which made it unlawful to execute the incompetent, the high court said a defendant had to have a "rational understanding" of why he was going to be put to death.
Panetti's lead counsel, Greg Wiercioch, all but said his death row days were numbered.
"Today the Supreme Court recognized that executing Scott Panetti would be a mindless, meaningless and miserable spectacle," Wiercioch said.
His assumption was that any court ordered to review Panetti's case in light of the Supreme Court's ruling — which required that defendants have more than just a technical understanding why they were being put to death — would see how sick he is and spare him the needle.
Malingering suspected
Sparks, however, did nothing of the sort.
While acknowledging that Panetti is seriously mentally ill, Sparks, however, seized on the opinion of three doctors hired by the state who suspected malingering and found behavior inconsistent with previous diagnoses of schizophrenia and schizoaffective disorder.
Sparks was also persuaded by tape recordings of conversations between Panetti and his parents. They indicate he had a good grasp of his legal case, and that he had adjusted his attitude and his level of cooperation with doctors depending on which side was paying them.
To Sparks, Panetti's words suggested a rational appreciation of his predicament.
"It is not seriously disputable that Panetti suffers from paranoid delusions of some type, and these delusions may well have contributed to his murder of Joe and Amanda Alvarado," Sparks wrote. "However, it is equally apparent from his recorded conversations with his parents that these delusions do not prevent him from having both a factual and rational understanding that he committed those murders, was tried and convicted, and is sentenced to die for them."
Wiercioch said Sparks essentially ignored 30 years of medical evidence and relied on a small amount of recorded conversation that did not mean anything when viewed in light of Panetti's system of delusions.
Wiercioch insists Sparks missed the point of the Supreme Court's decision: A condemned inmate's competency has to be considered in light of his broader understanding of the crime, why he committed it and why he is being punished for it.
Careful examination
In its review of the Panetti case, the Supreme Court acknowledged that "rational understanding" is a difficult concept to define. It also pointed out that some offenders might be so callous, unrepentant or lacking in compassion that they might seem out of touch with reality, which does not mean they cannot be executed.
But the high court said that defendants who are seriously mentally ill need to be carefully examined to see that what they believe and understand has some connection to the truth.
"Gross delusions stemming from a severe mental disorder may put an awareness of a link between crime and its punishment in a context so far removed from reality that the punishment can serve no proper purpose," the majority opinion stated. "A prisoner's awareness of the State's rationale for an execution is not the same as a rational understanding of it."
Sparks' opinion took a limited view of what that means. Panetti's illness and belief system are largely irrelevant now if he can talk reasonably about his appeals and understands he is engaged in an adversarial process that could end with his execution, the judge said.
Understanding matters
Under Sparks' interpretation, even the most bizarre delusional system would matter little — say, Panetti believing he killed his in-laws because he had been anointed by God to stop an alien invasion of Earth — because the only matter relevant for execution competency would be a rational understanding of the legal process involved in obtaining it.
"The tapes of Panetti's conversations with his parents establish that Panetti has a fairly sophisticated understanding of his case, up to and including the legal intricacies presented by Ford and the Supreme Court's remand opinion," Sparks wrote.
Sparks also wrote that Panetti's unwillingness to engage mental health experts equally regardless of which side was employing them also worked against the claim that he is too ill to understand what is going on.
"This suggests nothing more exotic than a rational understanding that Panetti's legal defense is an adversarial process and the State is on the other side," the judge stated.
The case will be appealed and ultimately could end up back with the Supreme Court for justices to determine whether Sparks followed the intent of their previous ruling.
Tuesday, June 17, 2008
Washington Post Editorial on Percy Walton
From June 12, 2008:
A Courageous Commutation
Mr. Kaine spares the life of a man on death row.
"Timothy M. Kaine (D), a confidant of Barack Obama's and the first governor outside Illinois to endorse the senator's bid for the Democratic presidential nomination, is routinely mentioned as a vice-presidential prospect. Many politicians in his position might bend or suspend principle to keep such prospects alive. But this week, Mr. Kaine commuted the death sentence of a mentally deficient triple killer to life in prison without parole. Under the circumstances, the decision, which could well provide convenient fodder for Republican attack ads in a national campaign, was courageous as well as fair-minded and fact-based.
As a candidate for governor in 2005, Mr. Kaine, a devout Catholic and lifelong opponent of capital punishment, said he would allow executions to proceed as a function of his office in respect of Virginia law. He has been true to his word, permitting five executions to go forward, more than any state except Texas, Oklahoma and Ohio. But the case of Percy L. Walton rightly gave him pause when he first reviewed it in 2006, and it was Mr. Walton's death sentence that the governor commuted on Monday.
There is no doubt about Mr. Walton's guilt, or the brutality of his crime: In 1996, shortly after his 18th birthday, he shot three people at close range, including an elderly couple, Jessie and Elizabeth Kendrick, in the Southside city of Danville. A year later he pleaded guilty to the three murders.
The question of whether he was or remains competent to face execution has prompted the governor's scrutiny. Confronted with abundant evidence -- from the state Department of Corrections and other sources -- that Mr. Walton is mentally retarded, profoundly confused and only dimly aware of his sentence, the governor twice postponed his execution (originally set for June 2006) to allow further evaluation. Before giving the green light, Mr. Kaine wanted to be satisfied that Mr. Walton met the test laid down by the Supreme Court more than two decades ago: that the condemned man is fit for execution only if he understands that he's been sentenced to death and the reason for that sentence.
At his best, Mr. Walton seemed only vaguely aware of his situation. He told one psychiatrist that he expected to have access to a telephone and a job at Burger King after his execution. Over time, experts who assessed Mr. Walton have disagreed on his mental capacity and ability to grasp the fate that awaited him. So have judges. Ruling on his case in 2006, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, perhaps the nation's most conservative federal court, split 7 to 6 in deciding that he was mentally fit to be executed. Since then, there seems little doubt that his condition has deteriorated. Given the Supreme Court standard, it would have been a travesty of justice for Mr. Kaineto permit the state to execute such a man. In commuting his sentence, Mr. Kaine recognized and applied that standard, acting with guts and decency.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/06/11/AR2008061103440.html
A Courageous Commutation
Mr. Kaine spares the life of a man on death row.
"Timothy M. Kaine (D), a confidant of Barack Obama's and the first governor outside Illinois to endorse the senator's bid for the Democratic presidential nomination, is routinely mentioned as a vice-presidential prospect. Many politicians in his position might bend or suspend principle to keep such prospects alive. But this week, Mr. Kaine commuted the death sentence of a mentally deficient triple killer to life in prison without parole. Under the circumstances, the decision, which could well provide convenient fodder for Republican attack ads in a national campaign, was courageous as well as fair-minded and fact-based.
As a candidate for governor in 2005, Mr. Kaine, a devout Catholic and lifelong opponent of capital punishment, said he would allow executions to proceed as a function of his office in respect of Virginia law. He has been true to his word, permitting five executions to go forward, more than any state except Texas, Oklahoma and Ohio. But the case of Percy L. Walton rightly gave him pause when he first reviewed it in 2006, and it was Mr. Walton's death sentence that the governor commuted on Monday.
There is no doubt about Mr. Walton's guilt, or the brutality of his crime: In 1996, shortly after his 18th birthday, he shot three people at close range, including an elderly couple, Jessie and Elizabeth Kendrick, in the Southside city of Danville. A year later he pleaded guilty to the three murders.
The question of whether he was or remains competent to face execution has prompted the governor's scrutiny. Confronted with abundant evidence -- from the state Department of Corrections and other sources -- that Mr. Walton is mentally retarded, profoundly confused and only dimly aware of his sentence, the governor twice postponed his execution (originally set for June 2006) to allow further evaluation. Before giving the green light, Mr. Kaine wanted to be satisfied that Mr. Walton met the test laid down by the Supreme Court more than two decades ago: that the condemned man is fit for execution only if he understands that he's been sentenced to death and the reason for that sentence.
At his best, Mr. Walton seemed only vaguely aware of his situation. He told one psychiatrist that he expected to have access to a telephone and a job at Burger King after his execution. Over time, experts who assessed Mr. Walton have disagreed on his mental capacity and ability to grasp the fate that awaited him. So have judges. Ruling on his case in 2006, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, perhaps the nation's most conservative federal court, split 7 to 6 in deciding that he was mentally fit to be executed. Since then, there seems little doubt that his condition has deteriorated. Given the Supreme Court standard, it would have been a travesty of justice for Mr. Kaineto permit the state to execute such a man. In commuting his sentence, Mr. Kaine recognized and applied that standard, acting with guts and decency.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/06/11/AR2008061103440.html
Tuesday, June 10, 2008
NAMI Poll on Perceptions of Schizophrenia
The National Alliance on Mental Illness (NAMI) recently commissioned a poll from Harris Interactive regarding public awareness of and attitudes towards schizophrenia.
Here are some of the findings, pulled from the NAMI report:
Two million Americans are living with schizophrenia (1% of the nation's population age 18 or older). NAMI notes that this is twice the number of people living with HIV/AIDS.
With medication, the symptoms of schizophrenia can often be controlled successfully. About 50% of those diagnosed with the illness can improve significantly or recover completely over time. However, only a third of those living with schizophrenia actually receive treatment, and there is an enormous delay, averaging 8.5 years, between when someone first experiences symptoms and when he/she receives treatment.
People mistake, overemphasize, or underestimate certain symptoms of schizophrenia. The greatest misconception (64%) is that "split or multiple personalities" are symptoms of schizophrenia. Symptoms such as drug abuse (24%), alcohol abuse (23%), insomnia (41%), and disorganized speech (35%) are also not widely recognized.
Violent behavior as a symptom was selected by 60% of the public, which represents a fundamental fault line in how Americans view schizophrenia and other mental illnesses. Ironically, most individuals with schizophrenia are not prone to violence; they typically withdraw from social interaction and simply prefer to be left alone.
The U.S. Surgeon General reported ten years ago that although some research exists to support public concern, "the overall likelihood of violence is low" and the "overall contribution of mental disorders to the total level of violence in society is exceptionally small." The "greatest risk" is from persons dually diagnosed with both a mental illness and a substance abuse disorder. There is also a "small elevation of risk" for persons with severe disorders such as psychosis, "especially if they are noncompliant with their medication."
Other studies support the U.S. Surgeon General's basic assessment and the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) has noted that substance abuse "always increases violent behavior, regardless of the presence of schizophrenia." Meanwhile, people with serious mental illnesses are as many as ten times more likely to be victims of violence than the general public.
[Editor's Note: Professor Dorean Marguerite Koenig, a member of the ABA's Task Force on Mental Disability and the Death Penalty and a Professor of Law at the Thomas M. Cooley Law School, notes that schizophrenia is by far the most common mental disorder seen in capital defendants.]
The vast majority of Americans recognize that schizophrenia is an illness (85%) and that with ongoing care, people diagnosed with schizophrenia can lead independent lives (79%).
But only one-fourth (24%) of the general public consider themselves to be familiar with the illness. In a list of 11 common medical conditions that included heart disease, cancer, diabetes, and depression, only Lou Gehrig's disease and multiple sclerosis ranked lower than schizophrenia in familiarity.
***
For more information and to read the full report, visit http://www.nami.org/.
Here are some of the findings, pulled from the NAMI report:
Two million Americans are living with schizophrenia (1% of the nation's population age 18 or older). NAMI notes that this is twice the number of people living with HIV/AIDS.
With medication, the symptoms of schizophrenia can often be controlled successfully. About 50% of those diagnosed with the illness can improve significantly or recover completely over time. However, only a third of those living with schizophrenia actually receive treatment, and there is an enormous delay, averaging 8.5 years, between when someone first experiences symptoms and when he/she receives treatment.
People mistake, overemphasize, or underestimate certain symptoms of schizophrenia. The greatest misconception (64%) is that "split or multiple personalities" are symptoms of schizophrenia. Symptoms such as drug abuse (24%), alcohol abuse (23%), insomnia (41%), and disorganized speech (35%) are also not widely recognized.
Violent behavior as a symptom was selected by 60% of the public, which represents a fundamental fault line in how Americans view schizophrenia and other mental illnesses. Ironically, most individuals with schizophrenia are not prone to violence; they typically withdraw from social interaction and simply prefer to be left alone.
The U.S. Surgeon General reported ten years ago that although some research exists to support public concern, "the overall likelihood of violence is low" and the "overall contribution of mental disorders to the total level of violence in society is exceptionally small." The "greatest risk" is from persons dually diagnosed with both a mental illness and a substance abuse disorder. There is also a "small elevation of risk" for persons with severe disorders such as psychosis, "especially if they are noncompliant with their medication."
Other studies support the U.S. Surgeon General's basic assessment and the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) has noted that substance abuse "always increases violent behavior, regardless of the presence of schizophrenia." Meanwhile, people with serious mental illnesses are as many as ten times more likely to be victims of violence than the general public.
[Editor's Note: Professor Dorean Marguerite Koenig, a member of the ABA's Task Force on Mental Disability and the Death Penalty and a Professor of Law at the Thomas M. Cooley Law School, notes that schizophrenia is by far the most common mental disorder seen in capital defendants.]
The vast majority of Americans recognize that schizophrenia is an illness (85%) and that with ongoing care, people diagnosed with schizophrenia can lead independent lives (79%).
But only one-fourth (24%) of the general public consider themselves to be familiar with the illness. In a list of 11 common medical conditions that included heart disease, cancer, diabetes, and depression, only Lou Gehrig's disease and multiple sclerosis ranked lower than schizophrenia in familiarity.
***
For more information and to read the full report, visit http://www.nami.org/.
Coverage of Walton Commutation
From the Richmond Times-Dispatch ("Triple murderer spared from execution by Kaine," June 10, 2008):
"Gov. Timothy M. Kaine commuted Percy Levar Walton's death sentences to life without parole yesterday, sparing the triple murderer execution by injection tonight.
Though courts have held that Walton could be executed, Kaine said he granted clemency because Walton was not mentally competent. In 2006, Kaine twice delayed Walton's execution over concerns he was mentally ill.
'Given the extended period of time over which Walton has exhibited this lack of mental competence, I must conclude that a commutation of his sentence . . . is now the only constitutionally appropriate course of action,' Kaine said in a prepared statement.
In 1996, Walton murdered Jessie Kendrick, 80, Elizabeth Kendrick, 81, and Archie D. Moore Jr., 33. All three lived near Walton in Danville. Kaine said there was no doubt Walton was guilty of the crimes, and he did not question the decision to seek the death penalty.
'The victims met a fate they did not deserve, and the families of the victims have suffered greatly from the loss of their loved ones,' Kaine said.
Learning of Kaine's decision, Irene Jurscaga, 87, of Suffolk, sister of Elizabeth Kendrick, said, 'I'm very disappointed.' Earlier yesterday, she said she hoped the clemency request would be turned down.
'He killed three people. He killed my dear sister, my brother-in-law. They were innocent people. This has been torture for us for the last 12 years,' she said. 'When he committed this crime . . . he knew what he was doing.'
Kaine said that while Walton may have been sane when he committed the murders, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that the Constitution 'forbids the execution of those who are unaware of the punishment they are about to suffer and why they are to suffer it.'
Virginia Attorney General Bob McDonnell said he respectfully disagrees with Kaine's decision. 'The United States Supreme Court denied Walton's petition in which he argued that he is incompetent and requested that his execution be stayed,' he said.
McDonnell said nothing prevented Walton from bringing evidence of incompetence before the courts. 'Evidence of an inmate's competency is more effectively evaluated by a judicial officer,' McDonnell said.
Kaine, who opposes capital punishment, has let five executions proceed. This was the first time he commuted a death sentence. Governors L. Douglas Wilder, George Allen, Jim Gilmore and Mark R. Warner commuted a total of seven death sentences since executions were allowed to resume in 1976.
Experts have differed on Walton's condition over the years.
In June 2006, Kaine said Walton's clemency petition presented information that Walton had schizophrenia and that his mental state had deteriorated since 2003, the most recent information the courts had to consider at the time in 2006.
'I was compelled to conclude [in 2006] that Walton was seriously mentally impaired and that he met the Supreme Court's definition of mental incompetence,' he said.
Since then, Kaine said, there has been no improvement. 'One cannot reasonably conclude that Walton is fully aware of the punishment he is about to suffer and why he is to suffer it,' Kaine said.
Nash Bilisoly, one of Walton's lawyers, said, 'I think the governor acted appropriately and compassionately in granting the clemency request.'
He said he asked prison authorities to notify Walton, who on Thursday was moved from death row to the Greensville Correctional Center, where executions are conducted.
The news, Bilisoly said, 'won't make any difference to him. He will not know.'
"Gov. Timothy M. Kaine commuted Percy Levar Walton's death sentences to life without parole yesterday, sparing the triple murderer execution by injection tonight.
Though courts have held that Walton could be executed, Kaine said he granted clemency because Walton was not mentally competent. In 2006, Kaine twice delayed Walton's execution over concerns he was mentally ill.
'Given the extended period of time over which Walton has exhibited this lack of mental competence, I must conclude that a commutation of his sentence . . . is now the only constitutionally appropriate course of action,' Kaine said in a prepared statement.
In 1996, Walton murdered Jessie Kendrick, 80, Elizabeth Kendrick, 81, and Archie D. Moore Jr., 33. All three lived near Walton in Danville. Kaine said there was no doubt Walton was guilty of the crimes, and he did not question the decision to seek the death penalty.
'The victims met a fate they did not deserve, and the families of the victims have suffered greatly from the loss of their loved ones,' Kaine said.
Learning of Kaine's decision, Irene Jurscaga, 87, of Suffolk, sister of Elizabeth Kendrick, said, 'I'm very disappointed.' Earlier yesterday, she said she hoped the clemency request would be turned down.
'He killed three people. He killed my dear sister, my brother-in-law. They were innocent people. This has been torture for us for the last 12 years,' she said. 'When he committed this crime . . . he knew what he was doing.'
Kaine said that while Walton may have been sane when he committed the murders, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that the Constitution 'forbids the execution of those who are unaware of the punishment they are about to suffer and why they are to suffer it.'
Virginia Attorney General Bob McDonnell said he respectfully disagrees with Kaine's decision. 'The United States Supreme Court denied Walton's petition in which he argued that he is incompetent and requested that his execution be stayed,' he said.
McDonnell said nothing prevented Walton from bringing evidence of incompetence before the courts. 'Evidence of an inmate's competency is more effectively evaluated by a judicial officer,' McDonnell said.
Kaine, who opposes capital punishment, has let five executions proceed. This was the first time he commuted a death sentence. Governors L. Douglas Wilder, George Allen, Jim Gilmore and Mark R. Warner commuted a total of seven death sentences since executions were allowed to resume in 1976.
Experts have differed on Walton's condition over the years.
In June 2006, Kaine said Walton's clemency petition presented information that Walton had schizophrenia and that his mental state had deteriorated since 2003, the most recent information the courts had to consider at the time in 2006.
'I was compelled to conclude [in 2006] that Walton was seriously mentally impaired and that he met the Supreme Court's definition of mental incompetence,' he said.
Since then, Kaine said, there has been no improvement. 'One cannot reasonably conclude that Walton is fully aware of the punishment he is about to suffer and why he is to suffer it,' Kaine said.
Nash Bilisoly, one of Walton's lawyers, said, 'I think the governor acted appropriately and compassionately in granting the clemency request.'
He said he asked prison authorities to notify Walton, who on Thursday was moved from death row to the Greensville Correctional Center, where executions are conducted.
The news, Bilisoly said, 'won't make any difference to him. He will not know.'
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