According to The Daily News, Texas death row inmate Gaylon George Walbey has received a new sentencing hearing from the 5th Circuit Court of Appeals ("Death-row inmate could get new hearing," March 15, 2009). Here's the full article:
A convicted killer sentenced to die for the 1993 slaying of a college teacher will soon return to Galveston, where attorneys will decide whether to seek a new punishment hearing or permanently remove him from death row.
After 12 years lobbying the courts for his client Gaylon George Walbey Jr., defense attorney Brian Wice won a new punishment hearing in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit on grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel.
Meanwhile, the National Alliance on Mental Illness continues to lobby against states imposing death-sentences in cases against the mentally ill, a situation that is not unique to Texas, said Ron Honberg, the organization’s legal director.
Walbey, 34, who was diagnosed with schizophrenia as a child, repeatedly bludgeoned Marionette Beyah — his former foster mother and a Galveston College teacher — inside her island home May 4, 1993, authorities said.
No Supreme Court Review
With the assent of the state’s Office of Solicitor General and Galveston County Criminal District Attorney Kurt Sistrunk, Texas Attorney General Greg Abbott decided not to ask the U.S. Supreme Court to review the appeals court’s decision, said Thomas Kelley, a spokesman for Abbott.
Wice declined to discuss his negotiations with Sistrunk, but said Walbey, who is no longer under a death sentence, would likely return to Galveston soon where a decision on whether to impose a life sentence or hold a new punishment hearing would be forthcoming.
Roger Ezell — who now works for Sistrunk — failed to investigate “a cornucopia of mitigating circumstances about (Walbey’s) horrific upbringing and background that would have led at least one juror to reject a death sentence,” Wice said.
Prosecutors gave Ezell, who defended Walbey, a mass of mitigating material, such as medical records and records from juvenile court, school, child services and health and human services, Wice said.
The records “painted a portrait of Gaylon’s upbringing and background that even the conservative Fifth Circuit described as ‘nightmarish,’” Wice said.
Ezell said a federal judge and lower appellate court upheld the death sentence, but a state district court and federal magistrate ruled in Wice’s favor, ultimately leading to the higher appeals court’s ruling.
The U.S. Supreme Court has with previous death-penalty cases raised the question whether mentally ill defendants understand the nature of the death penalty enforced upon them, Honberg said.
Scott Louis Panetti was convicted of capital murder in Texas in the 1992 death of his in-laws, but the U.S. Supreme Court ordered a temporary halt to Panetti’s death sentence and remanded the case for further consideration, saying Panetti was sentenced to die despite a well-documented history of mental illness. Panetti remains on Texas’ death row.
‘Not Unique To Texas’
Panetti represented himself and subpoenaed for his trial Jesus, former President John F. Kennedy and Pope John Paul II, Honberg said.
“This is not unique to Texas,” Honberg said. “We’ve followed cases in Virginia, Georgia, Indiana and other states as well. There are four states, North Carolina, Tennessee, Indiana and Kentucky, that have legislation pending or are considering legislation to reduce the application of the death penalty where serious mental illness is involved.”
Brain disorders have a profound impact on a person’s comprehension of reality, Honberg said.
Walbey was diagnosed with schizophrenia at a very young age, although it doesn’t appear that he suffers from it now, Wice said.
Beyah’s Death Remembered
Sistrunk, who tried the case and argued for the death penalty, said he remembered the circumstances surrounding Beyah’s death as if it were yesterday. These cases stay with you, and your victims stay with you, too, Sistrunk said.
“I still remember arguing to the jury how Ms. Beyah was repeatedly beat over the head by the defendant with a fire extinguisher, and that not having killed her, she was then stabbed repeatedly with multiple knives,” Sistrunk said.
One of the knives broke off in Beyah’s back, Sistrunk said.
“The defendant then tried to cut her throat, and that not having killed her, the defendant began choking her with an electrical cord,” Sistrunk said. “Finally he just left her there on the floor of her home, breathing her last breath, as he stepped over her and dug in her purse for her car keys.”
Decision By August
The decision on whether to seek a new punishment hearing for Walbey or to impose a life sentence must be made by mid-August, Sistrunk said.
“We’ve begun our review of the evidence from the first trial and are still awaiting evidence that was offered by defendant’s counsel during the appellate process,” Sistrunk said. “We’ve also contacted the family of Ms. Beyah to begin some discussions on our options at this point.”
Sistrunk could remember only one Galveston County case, that of Santiago Varelas, where a death sentenced was reversed. The case was retried in 2002, and the decision was made not to pursue the death penalty. Varelas was found guilty again and sentenced to life in prison, Sistrunk said.
“Having been personally involved in it and remembering it all, the temptation is to make a quick decision to seek death,” Sistrunk said of Walbey’s case. “But there is no substitute for reviewing everything that is available to us now, and that is what we will be doing over the next few months.”
Showing posts with label Panetti. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Panetti. Show all posts
Monday, March 16, 2009
Wednesday, June 18, 2008
More on Scott Panetti
From the Houston Chronicle ("Austin judge finds inmate sane enough for execution; More appeals are likely in the landmark case," June 17, 2008):
For 15 years, Scott Panetti has been Example No. 1 of the problems that result when mental illness crosses paths with the criminal justice system.
They were evident at his capital murder trial, when he represented himself and dressed up in a purple cowboy suit, making a bad joke of sober proceedings when he subpoenaed JFK and Jesus Christ. And they were just as apparent years later when the state tried to execute Panetti, only to see appeals courts step in and grapple with the question of whether he was too crazy to kill.
Now an Austin federal judge has decided that Panetti, convicted by a Kerr County jury of killing his in-laws in 1992, may not be quite as sick as advertised and likely has tried to manipulate doctors assigned to investigate his mental state.
U.S. District Judge Sam Sparks, who conducted a hearing on Panetti's sanity in February, concluded that he does not deserve the protection of the courts — at least not in his current state.
"If any mentally ill person is competent to be executed for his crime, this record establishes it is Scott Panetti," Sparks concluded in his 62-page opinion.
A year ago, Panetti's lawyers were celebrating a decision by the U.S. Supreme Court that declared Texas' standard for deciding competency for execution was so narrow as to be almost meaningless.
Expanding on its 1986 ruling in Ford v. Wainwright, which made it unlawful to execute the incompetent, the high court said a defendant had to have a "rational understanding" of why he was going to be put to death.
Panetti's lead counsel, Greg Wiercioch, all but said his death row days were numbered.
"Today the Supreme Court recognized that executing Scott Panetti would be a mindless, meaningless and miserable spectacle," Wiercioch said.
His assumption was that any court ordered to review Panetti's case in light of the Supreme Court's ruling — which required that defendants have more than just a technical understanding why they were being put to death — would see how sick he is and spare him the needle.
Malingering suspected
Sparks, however, did nothing of the sort.
While acknowledging that Panetti is seriously mentally ill, Sparks, however, seized on the opinion of three doctors hired by the state who suspected malingering and found behavior inconsistent with previous diagnoses of schizophrenia and schizoaffective disorder.
Sparks was also persuaded by tape recordings of conversations between Panetti and his parents. They indicate he had a good grasp of his legal case, and that he had adjusted his attitude and his level of cooperation with doctors depending on which side was paying them.
To Sparks, Panetti's words suggested a rational appreciation of his predicament.
"It is not seriously disputable that Panetti suffers from paranoid delusions of some type, and these delusions may well have contributed to his murder of Joe and Amanda Alvarado," Sparks wrote. "However, it is equally apparent from his recorded conversations with his parents that these delusions do not prevent him from having both a factual and rational understanding that he committed those murders, was tried and convicted, and is sentenced to die for them."
Wiercioch said Sparks essentially ignored 30 years of medical evidence and relied on a small amount of recorded conversation that did not mean anything when viewed in light of Panetti's system of delusions.
Wiercioch insists Sparks missed the point of the Supreme Court's decision: A condemned inmate's competency has to be considered in light of his broader understanding of the crime, why he committed it and why he is being punished for it.
Careful examination
In its review of the Panetti case, the Supreme Court acknowledged that "rational understanding" is a difficult concept to define. It also pointed out that some offenders might be so callous, unrepentant or lacking in compassion that they might seem out of touch with reality, which does not mean they cannot be executed.
But the high court said that defendants who are seriously mentally ill need to be carefully examined to see that what they believe and understand has some connection to the truth.
"Gross delusions stemming from a severe mental disorder may put an awareness of a link between crime and its punishment in a context so far removed from reality that the punishment can serve no proper purpose," the majority opinion stated. "A prisoner's awareness of the State's rationale for an execution is not the same as a rational understanding of it."
Sparks' opinion took a limited view of what that means. Panetti's illness and belief system are largely irrelevant now if he can talk reasonably about his appeals and understands he is engaged in an adversarial process that could end with his execution, the judge said.
Understanding matters
Under Sparks' interpretation, even the most bizarre delusional system would matter little — say, Panetti believing he killed his in-laws because he had been anointed by God to stop an alien invasion of Earth — because the only matter relevant for execution competency would be a rational understanding of the legal process involved in obtaining it.
"The tapes of Panetti's conversations with his parents establish that Panetti has a fairly sophisticated understanding of his case, up to and including the legal intricacies presented by Ford and the Supreme Court's remand opinion," Sparks wrote.
Sparks also wrote that Panetti's unwillingness to engage mental health experts equally regardless of which side was employing them also worked against the claim that he is too ill to understand what is going on.
"This suggests nothing more exotic than a rational understanding that Panetti's legal defense is an adversarial process and the State is on the other side," the judge stated.
The case will be appealed and ultimately could end up back with the Supreme Court for justices to determine whether Sparks followed the intent of their previous ruling.
For 15 years, Scott Panetti has been Example No. 1 of the problems that result when mental illness crosses paths with the criminal justice system.
They were evident at his capital murder trial, when he represented himself and dressed up in a purple cowboy suit, making a bad joke of sober proceedings when he subpoenaed JFK and Jesus Christ. And they were just as apparent years later when the state tried to execute Panetti, only to see appeals courts step in and grapple with the question of whether he was too crazy to kill.
Now an Austin federal judge has decided that Panetti, convicted by a Kerr County jury of killing his in-laws in 1992, may not be quite as sick as advertised and likely has tried to manipulate doctors assigned to investigate his mental state.
U.S. District Judge Sam Sparks, who conducted a hearing on Panetti's sanity in February, concluded that he does not deserve the protection of the courts — at least not in his current state.
"If any mentally ill person is competent to be executed for his crime, this record establishes it is Scott Panetti," Sparks concluded in his 62-page opinion.
A year ago, Panetti's lawyers were celebrating a decision by the U.S. Supreme Court that declared Texas' standard for deciding competency for execution was so narrow as to be almost meaningless.
Expanding on its 1986 ruling in Ford v. Wainwright, which made it unlawful to execute the incompetent, the high court said a defendant had to have a "rational understanding" of why he was going to be put to death.
Panetti's lead counsel, Greg Wiercioch, all but said his death row days were numbered.
"Today the Supreme Court recognized that executing Scott Panetti would be a mindless, meaningless and miserable spectacle," Wiercioch said.
His assumption was that any court ordered to review Panetti's case in light of the Supreme Court's ruling — which required that defendants have more than just a technical understanding why they were being put to death — would see how sick he is and spare him the needle.
Malingering suspected
Sparks, however, did nothing of the sort.
While acknowledging that Panetti is seriously mentally ill, Sparks, however, seized on the opinion of three doctors hired by the state who suspected malingering and found behavior inconsistent with previous diagnoses of schizophrenia and schizoaffective disorder.
Sparks was also persuaded by tape recordings of conversations between Panetti and his parents. They indicate he had a good grasp of his legal case, and that he had adjusted his attitude and his level of cooperation with doctors depending on which side was paying them.
To Sparks, Panetti's words suggested a rational appreciation of his predicament.
"It is not seriously disputable that Panetti suffers from paranoid delusions of some type, and these delusions may well have contributed to his murder of Joe and Amanda Alvarado," Sparks wrote. "However, it is equally apparent from his recorded conversations with his parents that these delusions do not prevent him from having both a factual and rational understanding that he committed those murders, was tried and convicted, and is sentenced to die for them."
Wiercioch said Sparks essentially ignored 30 years of medical evidence and relied on a small amount of recorded conversation that did not mean anything when viewed in light of Panetti's system of delusions.
Wiercioch insists Sparks missed the point of the Supreme Court's decision: A condemned inmate's competency has to be considered in light of his broader understanding of the crime, why he committed it and why he is being punished for it.
Careful examination
In its review of the Panetti case, the Supreme Court acknowledged that "rational understanding" is a difficult concept to define. It also pointed out that some offenders might be so callous, unrepentant or lacking in compassion that they might seem out of touch with reality, which does not mean they cannot be executed.
But the high court said that defendants who are seriously mentally ill need to be carefully examined to see that what they believe and understand has some connection to the truth.
"Gross delusions stemming from a severe mental disorder may put an awareness of a link between crime and its punishment in a context so far removed from reality that the punishment can serve no proper purpose," the majority opinion stated. "A prisoner's awareness of the State's rationale for an execution is not the same as a rational understanding of it."
Sparks' opinion took a limited view of what that means. Panetti's illness and belief system are largely irrelevant now if he can talk reasonably about his appeals and understands he is engaged in an adversarial process that could end with his execution, the judge said.
Understanding matters
Under Sparks' interpretation, even the most bizarre delusional system would matter little — say, Panetti believing he killed his in-laws because he had been anointed by God to stop an alien invasion of Earth — because the only matter relevant for execution competency would be a rational understanding of the legal process involved in obtaining it.
"The tapes of Panetti's conversations with his parents establish that Panetti has a fairly sophisticated understanding of his case, up to and including the legal intricacies presented by Ford and the Supreme Court's remand opinion," Sparks wrote.
Sparks also wrote that Panetti's unwillingness to engage mental health experts equally regardless of which side was employing them also worked against the claim that he is too ill to understand what is going on.
"This suggests nothing more exotic than a rational understanding that Panetti's legal defense is an adversarial process and the State is on the other side," the judge stated.
The case will be appealed and ultimately could end up back with the Supreme Court for justices to determine whether Sparks followed the intent of their previous ruling.
Thursday, May 29, 2008
The Fredericksburg Standard on Scott Panetti
The following article appeared yesterday in the Fredericksburg Standard ("U.S. District Court Judge Rules Panetti Competent," May 28, 2008).
Nearly one year after a reprieve was ordered by the U.S. Supreme Court for Fredericksburg convicted killer Scott Panetti, 50, the U.S. District Court in Austin has determined that Panetti is competent to be executed for the 1992 shooting deaths of his wife's parents.
The recent order by Presiding Judge Sam Sparks of the U.S. District Court for the Western District now sends the case before the 5th Circuit Court, setting up a chain of legal proceedings that could ultimately return it to the U.S.Supreme Court.
District Attorney Bruce Curry of the 216th Judicial District in Kerrville confirmed Friday that Judge Sparks had re-heard the case and that he had issued "some fairly extensive findings of fact" in declaring Panetti competent to be executed.
Curry explained that, in making his recent decision, Judge Sparks had utilized new standards set out by the U.S. Supreme Court almost a year ago when Panetti's appeal was reversed.
The latest determination in Austin follows a June 28, 2007, ruling by the U.S. Supreme Court that temporarily blocked Panetti's execution.
At that time, the high court ruled in a 5-4 decision that the case must be sent back to Austin for Judge Sparks to determine if Panetti's delusions make him mentally incompetent to be executed.
In the meantime, Panetti has remained on death row.
In the court's 2007 majority decision, Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote that it is not enough for inmates to understand that they are to be executed -- as had been the standard developed by the 5th U.S. Court of Appeals.
Instead, Kennedy said that a U.S. Constitution restriction against cruel and unusual punishment -- established in a 1986 court holding -- demands that inmates also understand why they are to be executed.
(Editor's Note: The Court actually addressed the difference between mere "awareness" of the impending execution and the reason for it - the previous standard it had set forth in its Ford v. Wainwright decision - and a "rational understanding" of that execution. Judge Sparks was charged with determining whether Panetti possesses a rational understanding of the reason for his execution, though the Supreme Court did not necessarily provide any guidance as to what that understanding should look like.)
Panetti, who was treated over the years for schizophrenia and paranoid delusions, has claimed that he was sentenced for execution because satanic forces want him silenced from preaching the Gospel -- not as punishment for the shooting deaths of Fredericksburg residents Joe and Amanda Alvarado on the morning of Sept. 8, 1992, while his estranged wife and their toddler daughter watched.
In its 2007 ruling, the Supreme Court said that Panetti was improperly denied the chance to prove he is mentally unfit for execution.
But, in ordering the district court to reassess Panetti's competence, the court declined to provide a precise standard for assessing his claims, leaving that job up to the lower courts.
Last year's high court decision followed a lengthy legal process that had begun almost 12 years earlier.
In a 1995 capital murder trial at Kerrville where he acted as his own attorney, Panetti dressed up in cowboy attire, claiming that he had other personalities and even subpoenaing the late President John F. Kennedy and God.
However, the jury rejected his insanity defense and sentenced him to death.
Panetti had been scheduled to die by lethal injection on Feb. 5, 2004, but a stay of execution was issued the day before by U.S. District Judge Sparks for the Western District of Texas, pending an examination to determine if he was competent to be executed.
Subsequently, Judge Sparks ruled in October of 2004 in Austin that Panetti was sane enough to be executed but that he could not be put to death until the next tier of federal courts -- the 5th Circuit Court of Appeals -- addressed the former Fredericksburg resident's challenge.
The 5th Circuit Court's three-judge panel then ruled in May of 2006 that Panetti was sane enough to receive the death sentence.
In that ruling, the panel -- which interprets law for Texas, Louisiana and Mississippi -- said that mentally ill convicts can be executed as long as they have a basic understanding of their punishment.
That decision maintained that Panetti did not need to believe he was being executed for the murders of his estranged wife's parents.
Previously, state and federal appeals courts had found nothing wrong with Panetti's trial, and the U.S. Supreme Court had declined to hear his appeal.
In addition, the Texas Attorney General's Office had determined that Panetti was competent enough to be executed, and the Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles also voted, 15-1, against a reprieve.
Numerous appeals to have Panetti's death sentence commuted to life imprisonment have also failed.
***
In his ruling, Judge Sparks ordered a stay of execution for Scott Panetti pending the outcome of his appeals.
Nearly one year after a reprieve was ordered by the U.S. Supreme Court for Fredericksburg convicted killer Scott Panetti, 50, the U.S. District Court in Austin has determined that Panetti is competent to be executed for the 1992 shooting deaths of his wife's parents.
The recent order by Presiding Judge Sam Sparks of the U.S. District Court for the Western District now sends the case before the 5th Circuit Court, setting up a chain of legal proceedings that could ultimately return it to the U.S.Supreme Court.
District Attorney Bruce Curry of the 216th Judicial District in Kerrville confirmed Friday that Judge Sparks had re-heard the case and that he had issued "some fairly extensive findings of fact" in declaring Panetti competent to be executed.
Curry explained that, in making his recent decision, Judge Sparks had utilized new standards set out by the U.S. Supreme Court almost a year ago when Panetti's appeal was reversed.
The latest determination in Austin follows a June 28, 2007, ruling by the U.S. Supreme Court that temporarily blocked Panetti's execution.
At that time, the high court ruled in a 5-4 decision that the case must be sent back to Austin for Judge Sparks to determine if Panetti's delusions make him mentally incompetent to be executed.
In the meantime, Panetti has remained on death row.
In the court's 2007 majority decision, Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote that it is not enough for inmates to understand that they are to be executed -- as had been the standard developed by the 5th U.S. Court of Appeals.
Instead, Kennedy said that a U.S. Constitution restriction against cruel and unusual punishment -- established in a 1986 court holding -- demands that inmates also understand why they are to be executed.
(Editor's Note: The Court actually addressed the difference between mere "awareness" of the impending execution and the reason for it - the previous standard it had set forth in its Ford v. Wainwright decision - and a "rational understanding" of that execution. Judge Sparks was charged with determining whether Panetti possesses a rational understanding of the reason for his execution, though the Supreme Court did not necessarily provide any guidance as to what that understanding should look like.)
Panetti, who was treated over the years for schizophrenia and paranoid delusions, has claimed that he was sentenced for execution because satanic forces want him silenced from preaching the Gospel -- not as punishment for the shooting deaths of Fredericksburg residents Joe and Amanda Alvarado on the morning of Sept. 8, 1992, while his estranged wife and their toddler daughter watched.
In its 2007 ruling, the Supreme Court said that Panetti was improperly denied the chance to prove he is mentally unfit for execution.
But, in ordering the district court to reassess Panetti's competence, the court declined to provide a precise standard for assessing his claims, leaving that job up to the lower courts.
Last year's high court decision followed a lengthy legal process that had begun almost 12 years earlier.
In a 1995 capital murder trial at Kerrville where he acted as his own attorney, Panetti dressed up in cowboy attire, claiming that he had other personalities and even subpoenaing the late President John F. Kennedy and God.
However, the jury rejected his insanity defense and sentenced him to death.
Panetti had been scheduled to die by lethal injection on Feb. 5, 2004, but a stay of execution was issued the day before by U.S. District Judge Sparks for the Western District of Texas, pending an examination to determine if he was competent to be executed.
Subsequently, Judge Sparks ruled in October of 2004 in Austin that Panetti was sane enough to be executed but that he could not be put to death until the next tier of federal courts -- the 5th Circuit Court of Appeals -- addressed the former Fredericksburg resident's challenge.
The 5th Circuit Court's three-judge panel then ruled in May of 2006 that Panetti was sane enough to receive the death sentence.
In that ruling, the panel -- which interprets law for Texas, Louisiana and Mississippi -- said that mentally ill convicts can be executed as long as they have a basic understanding of their punishment.
That decision maintained that Panetti did not need to believe he was being executed for the murders of his estranged wife's parents.
Previously, state and federal appeals courts had found nothing wrong with Panetti's trial, and the U.S. Supreme Court had declined to hear his appeal.
In addition, the Texas Attorney General's Office had determined that Panetti was competent enough to be executed, and the Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles also voted, 15-1, against a reprieve.
Numerous appeals to have Panetti's death sentence commuted to life imprisonment have also failed.
***
In his ruling, Judge Sparks ordered a stay of execution for Scott Panetti pending the outcome of his appeals.
Thursday, April 3, 2008
More on Panetti Ruling
In his order denying Scott Panetti's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Judge Sparks further ordered that Panetti's execution shall be stayed pending the outcome of the appeal in this case.
Here's more on the ruling from The Austin Chronicle ("Panetti Sane Enough to Die," April 4, 2008):
"Texas death row inmate Scott Panetti is 'seriously mentally ill' and has been for some time – in fact, as U.S. District Judge Sam Sparks ruled on March 26, he was 'under the influence of this severe mental illness' when, in 1992, he murdered his in-laws, Joe and Amanda Alvarado, in Fredericksburg and remained ill 'when he insisted on representing himself at trial.' Yet Panetti is sane enough to be executed, Sparks ruled. His 'delusions do not prevent his rational understanding of the causal connection between those murders and his death sentence, and he in fact has such an understanding,' Sparks wrote. Indeed, Panetti's understanding 'is most clearly demonstrated by his rationally articulated position that the punishment is unjustified: He believes the state should not execute him because he was mentally ill when he committed the murders.'
Sparks ruled similarly in 2004, finding Panetti sane enough to die, but the U.S. Supreme Court remanded the case, opining that the previous handling of Panetti's case was 'flawed' and 'too restrictive' to satisfy the Eighth Amendment ban on cruel and unusual punishments. In deeming Panetti sane enough for execution, the courts had only considered whether Panetti was 'aware' that he faced execution and that the state said he would be executed because he murdered the Alvarados. The problem, Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote for the court majority, is that Panetti doesn't actually believe that to be the case. Rather, Panetti has long said that the real reason the state wants him dead is to prevent him from preaching the 'gospel of the Lord King.' The question, in part, Kennedy wrote, was whether the effects of mental illness can 'so impair' a prisoner's concept of reality so that he 'cannot reach a rational understanding of the reasons for the execution.'
The Supremes punted the Panetti case back to Sparks, tasking him with wading through the legal morass and taking a first crack at defining a standard against which to measure mental eligibility for execution – a standard that might ultimately be applied to other similarly situated inmates. In his ruling, however, Sparks raises additional questions about how to define and apply a broader standard – including wondering about the limits of making sanity determinations for an inmate like Panetti, whose impairment is 'cyclical.' In such a case, does a 'period of improved lucidity' mark 'him for death, or has he not 'regained' his sanity in a lucid period in the same way as a person who has made some stable improvement or recovery in mental condition can be said to have 'regained sanity'?' Sparks asks. 'The court is concerned by these questions for the future, but they are not the work of the day.'
Panetti's case will now be forwarded to the 5th U.S. Circuit Court for Appeals for review."
Here's more on the ruling from The Austin Chronicle ("Panetti Sane Enough to Die," April 4, 2008):
"Texas death row inmate Scott Panetti is 'seriously mentally ill' and has been for some time – in fact, as U.S. District Judge Sam Sparks ruled on March 26, he was 'under the influence of this severe mental illness' when, in 1992, he murdered his in-laws, Joe and Amanda Alvarado, in Fredericksburg and remained ill 'when he insisted on representing himself at trial.' Yet Panetti is sane enough to be executed, Sparks ruled. His 'delusions do not prevent his rational understanding of the causal connection between those murders and his death sentence, and he in fact has such an understanding,' Sparks wrote. Indeed, Panetti's understanding 'is most clearly demonstrated by his rationally articulated position that the punishment is unjustified: He believes the state should not execute him because he was mentally ill when he committed the murders.'
Sparks ruled similarly in 2004, finding Panetti sane enough to die, but the U.S. Supreme Court remanded the case, opining that the previous handling of Panetti's case was 'flawed' and 'too restrictive' to satisfy the Eighth Amendment ban on cruel and unusual punishments. In deeming Panetti sane enough for execution, the courts had only considered whether Panetti was 'aware' that he faced execution and that the state said he would be executed because he murdered the Alvarados. The problem, Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote for the court majority, is that Panetti doesn't actually believe that to be the case. Rather, Panetti has long said that the real reason the state wants him dead is to prevent him from preaching the 'gospel of the Lord King.' The question, in part, Kennedy wrote, was whether the effects of mental illness can 'so impair' a prisoner's concept of reality so that he 'cannot reach a rational understanding of the reasons for the execution.'
The Supremes punted the Panetti case back to Sparks, tasking him with wading through the legal morass and taking a first crack at defining a standard against which to measure mental eligibility for execution – a standard that might ultimately be applied to other similarly situated inmates. In his ruling, however, Sparks raises additional questions about how to define and apply a broader standard – including wondering about the limits of making sanity determinations for an inmate like Panetti, whose impairment is 'cyclical.' In such a case, does a 'period of improved lucidity' mark 'him for death, or has he not 'regained' his sanity in a lucid period in the same way as a person who has made some stable improvement or recovery in mental condition can be said to have 'regained sanity'?' Sparks asks. 'The court is concerned by these questions for the future, but they are not the work of the day.'
Panetti's case will now be forwarded to the 5th U.S. Circuit Court for Appeals for review."
Friday, March 28, 2008
Scott Panetti Deemed Competent to Be Executed
AFP reports that Judge Sam Sparks once again has found Scott Panetti competent to be executed ("Schizophrenic death row man in Texas on path to execution," March 27, 2008). The judge ruled that Panetti possessed sufficient rational understanding of the reason for his execution. Panetti believes that the state seeks his execution in order to prevent him from preaching the gospel in prison.
Here's the article:
"A schizophrenic inmate in Texas is again on the path to execution after a federal judge pronounced him sufficiently rational to understand why he has been sentenced to death.
In 1986 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that a convict could be executed only if that person realized that he or she was going to die, and understood why.
Scott Panetti, 50, was sentenced to die for a double homicide he acknowledged having committed.
But the Supreme Court in June blocked his execution and ordered judges in Austin, Texas to determine if Panetti realized that he was to be executed as punishment for the murder of his in-laws.
Federal Judge Sam Sparks in Austin, Texas gathered evidence from experts, prison cell mates, prison guards, and friends and relatives of Panetti to better understand the convict's mental state.
'Panetti was mentally ill when he committed his crime and continues to be mentally ill today,' read Sparks' opinion, issued Wednesday.
'However, he has both a factual and rational understanding of his crime, his impending death, and the causal retributive connection between the two.
'Therefore, if any mentally ill person is competent to be executed for his crimes, this record establishes it is Scott Panetti,' Sparks wrote.
In September 1992, Panetti, who had previously been hospitalized for serious schizophrenic problems, murdered his parents in-law.
A judge ruled that he was competent to stand trial, and he was allowed to represent himself in the case.
Dressed as a cowboy, in his trial Panetti called on Jesus Christ, the late U.S. president John F. Kennedy and the late Pope John Paul II as witnesses. His statements were laced with delirious and incomprehensible monologues."
Here's the article:
"A schizophrenic inmate in Texas is again on the path to execution after a federal judge pronounced him sufficiently rational to understand why he has been sentenced to death.
In 1986 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that a convict could be executed only if that person realized that he or she was going to die, and understood why.
Scott Panetti, 50, was sentenced to die for a double homicide he acknowledged having committed.
But the Supreme Court in June blocked his execution and ordered judges in Austin, Texas to determine if Panetti realized that he was to be executed as punishment for the murder of his in-laws.
Federal Judge Sam Sparks in Austin, Texas gathered evidence from experts, prison cell mates, prison guards, and friends and relatives of Panetti to better understand the convict's mental state.
'Panetti was mentally ill when he committed his crime and continues to be mentally ill today,' read Sparks' opinion, issued Wednesday.
'However, he has both a factual and rational understanding of his crime, his impending death, and the causal retributive connection between the two.
'Therefore, if any mentally ill person is competent to be executed for his crimes, this record establishes it is Scott Panetti,' Sparks wrote.
In September 1992, Panetti, who had previously been hospitalized for serious schizophrenic problems, murdered his parents in-law.
A judge ruled that he was competent to stand trial, and he was allowed to represent himself in the case.
Dressed as a cowboy, in his trial Panetti called on Jesus Christ, the late U.S. president John F. Kennedy and the late Pope John Paul II as witnesses. His statements were laced with delirious and incomprehensible monologues."
Wednesday, March 26, 2008
Op-Ed on the Issue of Self Representation
Jonathan Turley, a professor of law at George Washington University, comments on the Ahmad Edwards case (Indiana v. Edwards) in an op-ed that appeared today in the Los Angeles Times ("A fool and his lawyer," March 26, 2008). He too cites the case of Scott Panetti to illustrate the tremendous harm that can result when defendants' with severe mental illness are allowed to represent themselves.
Much of the commentary on the Edwards case thus far has focused on the low standards for competency to stand trial. According to Chapter 46B of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure:
“(a) A person is incompetent to stand trial if the person does not have:
1. sufficient present ability to consult with the person’s lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding; or
2. a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against the person.
(b) A defendant is presumed competent to stand trial and shall be found competent to stand trial unless proved incompetent by a preponderance of the evidence.”
Competency relates to a defendant’s mental state at the time of trial, not at the time of the alleged crime. Incompetency is not a defense to the crime charged. Evidence that a defendant is suffering from a mental illness is not enough to establish that he or she is incompetent to stand trial.
Here are excerpts from Turley's op-ed:
"Less than 1% of felony prisoners represent themselves. Many do great harm to their own cases and suffer the consequences of such self-inflicted wounds. There are also costs to others. When Colin Ferguson killed six passengers and injured 19 others on the Long Island Rail Road in 1993, for example, he insisted on representing himself despite the clear evidence that he was a delusional psychopath. Yet he was deemed fit to stand trial under the extremely low standard of competency. The resulting bizarre trial mixed moments of mental clarity with total fantasies of mistaken identifies. Victims were forced to be cross-examined by the man who shot them as he tried toconvince them that they saw someone else on the train. He was found guilty.
In a case in Texas in 1995, Scott Louis Panetti was treated as competent for trial and proceeded to represent himself in his murder case. He was a lunatic who dressed as a cowboy in court, tried to subpoena Jesus and clearly traumatized his estranged wife, Sonja, in a cross-examination that forced her to relive the murders of her parents. A jury convicted Panetti in 90 minutes. (The Supreme Court in 1997 stayed his execution on insanity grounds.) [Ed. Note: The Court stayed his execution in 2007, not 1997.]
Notably, his treating psychiatrist, Dr. F.E. Seale, asked the most poignant question after Panetti's conviction: 'My God, how in the world can our legal system allow an insane man to defend himself?'
The answer can be found not in the twisted minds of these defendants but in our own twisted legal standards. We have been manipulating 'competence' for years to guarantee that mentally ill individuals can be tried. After John W. Hinckley Jr. was found not guilty by reason of insanity in the assassination attempt on President Reagan in 1981, enraged politicians ripped up existing insanity laws and replaced them with standards so low that even the most clearly insane defendants, such as Andrea Yates, who killed her five children in Texas in 2001, would be viewed as entirely competent to stand trial.
When these same individuals then invoke their right to self-representation, however, we are caught in a trap of our own making.
Obviously, we are embarrassed when the people we seek to execute or imprison are so mentally incompetent that they make a farce out of a proceeding. Thus, judges seek ways to find them sane enough to execute or imprison -- but incompetent to argue their own cases. This is what happened in the case of Zacarias Moussaoui, who proved to be a barking lunatic before his terrorism trial. The court found him competent to stand trial but denied him the right to represent himself. (His appeal of that decision is pending in the U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals.)
There are relatively few major cases of self-representation, and most, like the Panetti and Edwards cases, would have been avoided by simply recognizing the defendants' incompetence to stand trial in the first place.
Rather than address the ridiculously low standard for competence to stand trial, many now want the Supreme Court to raise the standard for self-representation. But by imposing skill and educational requirements, courts could force many defendants to have others speak for them while they are expected to pay the costs of any resulting verdict.
If we insist on ignoring the mental illness of our defendants, then we should live with the untidy and unpleasant results.
Read the op-ed in its entirety.
Much of the commentary on the Edwards case thus far has focused on the low standards for competency to stand trial. According to Chapter 46B of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure:
“(a) A person is incompetent to stand trial if the person does not have:
1. sufficient present ability to consult with the person’s lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding; or
2. a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against the person.
(b) A defendant is presumed competent to stand trial and shall be found competent to stand trial unless proved incompetent by a preponderance of the evidence.”
Competency relates to a defendant’s mental state at the time of trial, not at the time of the alleged crime. Incompetency is not a defense to the crime charged. Evidence that a defendant is suffering from a mental illness is not enough to establish that he or she is incompetent to stand trial.
Here are excerpts from Turley's op-ed:
"Less than 1% of felony prisoners represent themselves. Many do great harm to their own cases and suffer the consequences of such self-inflicted wounds. There are also costs to others. When Colin Ferguson killed six passengers and injured 19 others on the Long Island Rail Road in 1993, for example, he insisted on representing himself despite the clear evidence that he was a delusional psychopath. Yet he was deemed fit to stand trial under the extremely low standard of competency. The resulting bizarre trial mixed moments of mental clarity with total fantasies of mistaken identifies. Victims were forced to be cross-examined by the man who shot them as he tried toconvince them that they saw someone else on the train. He was found guilty.
In a case in Texas in 1995, Scott Louis Panetti was treated as competent for trial and proceeded to represent himself in his murder case. He was a lunatic who dressed as a cowboy in court, tried to subpoena Jesus and clearly traumatized his estranged wife, Sonja, in a cross-examination that forced her to relive the murders of her parents. A jury convicted Panetti in 90 minutes. (The Supreme Court in 1997 stayed his execution on insanity grounds.) [Ed. Note: The Court stayed his execution in 2007, not 1997.]
Notably, his treating psychiatrist, Dr. F.E. Seale, asked the most poignant question after Panetti's conviction: 'My God, how in the world can our legal system allow an insane man to defend himself?'
The answer can be found not in the twisted minds of these defendants but in our own twisted legal standards. We have been manipulating 'competence' for years to guarantee that mentally ill individuals can be tried. After John W. Hinckley Jr. was found not guilty by reason of insanity in the assassination attempt on President Reagan in 1981, enraged politicians ripped up existing insanity laws and replaced them with standards so low that even the most clearly insane defendants, such as Andrea Yates, who killed her five children in Texas in 2001, would be viewed as entirely competent to stand trial.
When these same individuals then invoke their right to self-representation, however, we are caught in a trap of our own making.
Obviously, we are embarrassed when the people we seek to execute or imprison are so mentally incompetent that they make a farce out of a proceeding. Thus, judges seek ways to find them sane enough to execute or imprison -- but incompetent to argue their own cases. This is what happened in the case of Zacarias Moussaoui, who proved to be a barking lunatic before his terrorism trial. The court found him competent to stand trial but denied him the right to represent himself. (His appeal of that decision is pending in the U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals.)
There are relatively few major cases of self-representation, and most, like the Panetti and Edwards cases, would have been avoided by simply recognizing the defendants' incompetence to stand trial in the first place.
Rather than address the ridiculously low standard for competence to stand trial, many now want the Supreme Court to raise the standard for self-representation. But by imposing skill and educational requirements, courts could force many defendants to have others speak for them while they are expected to pay the costs of any resulting verdict.
If we insist on ignoring the mental illness of our defendants, then we should live with the untidy and unpleasant results.
Read the op-ed in its entirety.
Tuesday, March 25, 2008
Should Inmates with Severe Mental Illness Be Allowed to Represent Themselves?
Tomorrow, March 26, the U.S. Supreme Court will consider the case of Ahmad Edwards, a man with a history of mental illness who was found competent to stand trial but was not allowed to represent himself as he requested. Numerous death penalty cases have involved issues related to competency to stand trial; the Scott Panetti case in particular (cited in the article below) raises the issue of self representation by those with long histories of mental illness.
Here are excerpts from an article that appeared last week in USA Today ("High court to consider self-representation"):
"When Ahmad Edwards appealed his conviction of attempted murder and other charges, the Indiana Supreme Court agreed Edwards had the right to represent himself and reversed his conviction.
The Indiana attorney general's office appealed, arguing that allowing mentally impaired defendants to represent themselves undermines fair trials and erodes public confidence in the system.
'The consequences often are disastrous for both the defendants and the integrity — not to mention dignity — of the criminal justice system,' the Indiana attorney general's office wrote in its brief to the court.
Indiana's position is backed by the Justice Department, 19 other states and the American Bar Association.
Edwards' lawyer counters that the right to represent oneself gives the defendant power in the relationship with his attorney, and states should not have 'unfettered discretion' to place a higher standard on that right for certain defendants.
Since a 1993 Supreme Court ruling addressed the issue of the competency standards for waiving the right to counsel and pleading guilty, at least 60 legally competent but mentally impaired defendants have tried to represent themselves, according to the state.
In 1995, a Texas man defending himself on capital murder charges tried to subpoena Jesus, wore a cowboy outfit to court, and assumed an alternative personality when testifying.
In another case, Colin Ferguson was convicted in 1995 of killing six passengers on the Long Island Railroad after representing himself with the unsuccessful argument that someone else took the gun from his bag and shot the passengers.
Erica Hashimoto, a University of Georgia law school professor who conducted the first comprehensive study of felony defendants who chose to represent themselves, said they represent significantly less than 1% of all felony defendants. About 20% of the federal felony defendants she examined showed signs of mental illness.
And while there are different ways of determining the success of defendants representing themselves in state and federal courts, the bottom line is 'they certainly did not lose all of their cases at trial,' she said.
'To the extent that the states are worried about too many people representing themselves who are mentally ill, I think that's a product of the fact that our standard for competency to stand trial is so low,' she said. 'Once we say a defendant is competent to stand trial, I think it's dangerous to say that he is entitled to less rights than another defendant.' ..."
and
"The Supreme Court said in the 1975 case Faretta v. California that defendants have a constitutional right to waive counsel at trial if doing so voluntarily and intelligently.
In the 1993 case Godinez v. Moran, the court said the standard for determining competency to stand trial — whether the defendant can understand the proceedings and assist in his defense — is the same standard for waiving the right to counsel and pleading guilty.
Indiana argues that some courts have interpreted that decision to mean that the self-representation standard can't be lower than competency to stand trial, but it can be higher.
In Wisconsin, for example, the state Supreme Court has said trial judges can deny self-representation based on the defendant's education, literacy, fluency in English as well as physical or psychological disabilities.
Edwards' lawyer said Indiana is exaggerating the split in the courts on the issue, and the Supreme Court has already settled that it's the defendant's choice, not his skill, that determines self-representation."
Read the full article.
Here are excerpts from an article that appeared last week in USA Today ("High court to consider self-representation"):
"When Ahmad Edwards appealed his conviction of attempted murder and other charges, the Indiana Supreme Court agreed Edwards had the right to represent himself and reversed his conviction.
The Indiana attorney general's office appealed, arguing that allowing mentally impaired defendants to represent themselves undermines fair trials and erodes public confidence in the system.
'The consequences often are disastrous for both the defendants and the integrity — not to mention dignity — of the criminal justice system,' the Indiana attorney general's office wrote in its brief to the court.
Indiana's position is backed by the Justice Department, 19 other states and the American Bar Association.
Edwards' lawyer counters that the right to represent oneself gives the defendant power in the relationship with his attorney, and states should not have 'unfettered discretion' to place a higher standard on that right for certain defendants.
Since a 1993 Supreme Court ruling addressed the issue of the competency standards for waiving the right to counsel and pleading guilty, at least 60 legally competent but mentally impaired defendants have tried to represent themselves, according to the state.
In 1995, a Texas man defending himself on capital murder charges tried to subpoena Jesus, wore a cowboy outfit to court, and assumed an alternative personality when testifying.
In another case, Colin Ferguson was convicted in 1995 of killing six passengers on the Long Island Railroad after representing himself with the unsuccessful argument that someone else took the gun from his bag and shot the passengers.
Erica Hashimoto, a University of Georgia law school professor who conducted the first comprehensive study of felony defendants who chose to represent themselves, said they represent significantly less than 1% of all felony defendants. About 20% of the federal felony defendants she examined showed signs of mental illness.
And while there are different ways of determining the success of defendants representing themselves in state and federal courts, the bottom line is 'they certainly did not lose all of their cases at trial,' she said.
'To the extent that the states are worried about too many people representing themselves who are mentally ill, I think that's a product of the fact that our standard for competency to stand trial is so low,' she said. 'Once we say a defendant is competent to stand trial, I think it's dangerous to say that he is entitled to less rights than another defendant.' ..."
and
"The Supreme Court said in the 1975 case Faretta v. California that defendants have a constitutional right to waive counsel at trial if doing so voluntarily and intelligently.
In the 1993 case Godinez v. Moran, the court said the standard for determining competency to stand trial — whether the defendant can understand the proceedings and assist in his defense — is the same standard for waiving the right to counsel and pleading guilty.
Indiana argues that some courts have interpreted that decision to mean that the self-representation standard can't be lower than competency to stand trial, but it can be higher.
In Wisconsin, for example, the state Supreme Court has said trial judges can deny self-representation based on the defendant's education, literacy, fluency in English as well as physical or psychological disabilities.
Edwards' lawyer said Indiana is exaggerating the split in the courts on the issue, and the Supreme Court has already settled that it's the defendant's choice, not his skill, that determines self-representation."
Read the full article.
Thursday, February 14, 2008
More on Panetti Competency Hearing
Here are excerpts from an article by Jordan Smith that appeared in the Austin Chronicle ("Legal Battle Over When Prisoner Is Sane Enough for Execution Bounces Back Here," February 15, 2008), regarding last week's hearing on Scott Panetti's competency to be executed:
"The long, sad case of Texas death row inmate Scott Panetti landed back in federal district court last week, where Judge Sam Sparks is tasked with deciding whether Panetti is indeed sane enough to be executed. According to the state, Panetti is quite likely a malingerer who is clearly able to understand the connection between his crime and punishment and, Assistant Attorney General Tina Miranda argued in court on Feb. 6, Panetti's strong religious beliefs clearly evidence this fact: He believes forgiveness for his crime is integral to his salvation – that underlying connection between right and wrong is solid proof Panetti can comprehend his fate, Miranda argued. But Panetti's defenders, including Austin appellate attorney Keith Hampton, argue an ability to understand is not the same as actual comprehension. Panetti's hyperreligiosity is not anchored in any objective reality, they argue. Indeed, Panetti has long claimed the real motive for executing him is to stop him from preaching "the gospel of the Lord King." At stake is not only Panetti's life but also the evolution of a legal standard that could be applied in othercases where a prisoner's competence to face execution is at issue. ..."
and
"...the Supremes [U.S. Supreme Court] punted the case back to the Austin courtroom of Sparks, giving him the daunting task of wading through the legal morass of the Panetti case in order to divine whether he is sane enough to die – a decision that will become the first step in devising a standard for judging mental eligibility for execution that would ultimately be applied to other similarly situated inmates. (As such, it is inevitable the case will again be appealed, meaning that whatever test Sparks applies in his ruling will have to pass legal muster all the way back up the legal food chain to the high court.)
To Rusk State Hospital psychiatrist David Self, there is no doubt Panetti is too deluded to be considered competent: After evaluating Panetti in November, Self concluded Panetti is 'delusionally preoccupied with religious themes,' which he said is a 'very frequent manifestation' of schizophrenia. Moreover, he found nothing to suggest Panetti is faking his illness – if anything, he said, Panetti at times seemed to be 'faking good,' by trying to present himself as more rational than he actually is. However, Panetti does not comprehend the real reason for his execution, said Self, as he believes he's a player in a spiritual war being fought between the forces of good and evil. Self said Panetti told him that in this fight, the state of Texas has been deluded by the devil: Although the state has come to believe it seeks his execution as punishment for his crime, Panetti believes the state has become a pawn in the devil's game to silence his preaching.
Under questioning by Assistant AG Miranda, Self testified he believes Panetti is incapable of 'a rational understanding' of why he is to be executed. But, Miranda pointed out, Panetti comprehends the cause-and-effect nature of his circumstance and the concept of good and evil –indeed, the notion there is a 'war' between good and evil is not unusual and would not on its face be considered delusional, she noted. 'Is believing in spiritual warfare a fixed false belief?' Miranda asked Self.
'Not by itself,' Self replied. 'No.'"
Read the full article.
"The long, sad case of Texas death row inmate Scott Panetti landed back in federal district court last week, where Judge Sam Sparks is tasked with deciding whether Panetti is indeed sane enough to be executed. According to the state, Panetti is quite likely a malingerer who is clearly able to understand the connection between his crime and punishment and, Assistant Attorney General Tina Miranda argued in court on Feb. 6, Panetti's strong religious beliefs clearly evidence this fact: He believes forgiveness for his crime is integral to his salvation – that underlying connection between right and wrong is solid proof Panetti can comprehend his fate, Miranda argued. But Panetti's defenders, including Austin appellate attorney Keith Hampton, argue an ability to understand is not the same as actual comprehension. Panetti's hyperreligiosity is not anchored in any objective reality, they argue. Indeed, Panetti has long claimed the real motive for executing him is to stop him from preaching "the gospel of the Lord King." At stake is not only Panetti's life but also the evolution of a legal standard that could be applied in othercases where a prisoner's competence to face execution is at issue. ..."
and
"...the Supremes [U.S. Supreme Court] punted the case back to the Austin courtroom of Sparks, giving him the daunting task of wading through the legal morass of the Panetti case in order to divine whether he is sane enough to die – a decision that will become the first step in devising a standard for judging mental eligibility for execution that would ultimately be applied to other similarly situated inmates. (As such, it is inevitable the case will again be appealed, meaning that whatever test Sparks applies in his ruling will have to pass legal muster all the way back up the legal food chain to the high court.)
To Rusk State Hospital psychiatrist David Self, there is no doubt Panetti is too deluded to be considered competent: After evaluating Panetti in November, Self concluded Panetti is 'delusionally preoccupied with religious themes,' which he said is a 'very frequent manifestation' of schizophrenia. Moreover, he found nothing to suggest Panetti is faking his illness – if anything, he said, Panetti at times seemed to be 'faking good,' by trying to present himself as more rational than he actually is. However, Panetti does not comprehend the real reason for his execution, said Self, as he believes he's a player in a spiritual war being fought between the forces of good and evil. Self said Panetti told him that in this fight, the state of Texas has been deluded by the devil: Although the state has come to believe it seeks his execution as punishment for his crime, Panetti believes the state has become a pawn in the devil's game to silence his preaching.
Under questioning by Assistant AG Miranda, Self testified he believes Panetti is incapable of 'a rational understanding' of why he is to be executed. But, Miranda pointed out, Panetti comprehends the cause-and-effect nature of his circumstance and the concept of good and evil –indeed, the notion there is a 'war' between good and evil is not unusual and would not on its face be considered delusional, she noted. 'Is believing in spiritual warfare a fixed false belief?' Miranda asked Self.
'Not by itself,' Self replied. 'No.'"
Read the full article.
Monday, February 11, 2008
Competency Hearing for Scott Panetti
Last week Federal District Judge Sam Sparks presided over a hearing to determine whether Scott Panetti is competent to be executed. In June 2007, the U.S. Supreme Court blocked Panetti's execution, ruling that the Fifth Circuit Court of Criminal Appeals had used "an improperly restrictive test" in determining Panetti's competency. The Court also found that Panetti had not received a full and comprehensive competency hearing.
Here are excerpts from an article about the hearing that appeared in the Austin American-Statesman ("Judge must decide whether death row inmate's delusions prevent his execution," February 5, 2007):
"Convicted of killing his in-laws in 1992, Panetti believes satanic forces are seeking his execution to keep him from preaching the Gospel, his defense lawyers have testified.
The U.S. Supreme Court, according to the majority decision, ruled that the constitutional ban against cruel and unusual punishment means that inmates must understand why they are being put to death. The ruling did not provide aprecise standard for assessing Panetti's claims.
A psychiatrist from the Rusk State Hospital testified today that Panetti is schizophrenic. Dr. David Self said he interviewed Panetti for five hours in November and asked him if he knew why he was on death row. 'He said to preach the gospel of Jesus Christ,' Self said.
The doctor said he did not think Panetti was faking mental illness because of Panetti's frequent hospitalizations before the killings. Panetti showed signs on mental illness during his interview, Self said, including showing emotions that were more intense than normal, Self said. 'His anger would flare and his happiness was just too great,' Self said.
Sparks said at the beginning of the hearing that he feels that no matter what decision he makes, the case will be appealed and land back in his court. He said he also has to determine what would happen if Panetti was declared incompetent. 'Does that mean he can't be punished at all,?' Sparks said.
It was not know when the judge would reach a decision. The hearing is scheduled to last until at least Thursday. ..."
Read the full article.
Earlier coverage of the Panetti case is available here and here.
Here are excerpts from an article about the hearing that appeared in the Austin American-Statesman ("Judge must decide whether death row inmate's delusions prevent his execution," February 5, 2007):
"Convicted of killing his in-laws in 1992, Panetti believes satanic forces are seeking his execution to keep him from preaching the Gospel, his defense lawyers have testified.
The U.S. Supreme Court, according to the majority decision, ruled that the constitutional ban against cruel and unusual punishment means that inmates must understand why they are being put to death. The ruling did not provide aprecise standard for assessing Panetti's claims.
A psychiatrist from the Rusk State Hospital testified today that Panetti is schizophrenic. Dr. David Self said he interviewed Panetti for five hours in November and asked him if he knew why he was on death row. 'He said to preach the gospel of Jesus Christ,' Self said.
The doctor said he did not think Panetti was faking mental illness because of Panetti's frequent hospitalizations before the killings. Panetti showed signs on mental illness during his interview, Self said, including showing emotions that were more intense than normal, Self said. 'His anger would flare and his happiness was just too great,' Self said.
Sparks said at the beginning of the hearing that he feels that no matter what decision he makes, the case will be appealed and land back in his court. He said he also has to determine what would happen if Panetti was declared incompetent. 'Does that mean he can't be punished at all,?' Sparks said.
It was not know when the judge would reach a decision. The hearing is scheduled to last until at least Thursday. ..."
Read the full article.
Earlier coverage of the Panetti case is available here and here.
Monday, December 10, 2007
Court to Rule on Acting As Own Lawyer
From the Austin-American Statesman, December 7, 2007:
"The Supreme Court said Friday it will review whether a defendant who is judged competent to stand trial has the right to be his own lawyer, even if he has a history of serious mental illness.
Ahmad Edwards was convicted of attempted murder and other charges in 2005 following a shooting at an Indianapolis department store in 1999.
He was initially found to be schizophrenic and suffering from delusions and spent most of the five years following the shooting in state psychiatric facilities. But by 2005, he was judged competent to stand trial.
Edwards asked to represent himself, but a judge denied the request because he was concerned that Edwards' trial would not be fair. Edwards, represented by a lawyer, was convicted anyway and sentenced to 30 years in prison.
He appealed and Indiana courts agreed that his right to represent himself had been violated, citing a U.S. high court decision from 1993. The courts overturned his conviction and ordered a new trial.
State Supreme Court Justice Theodore Boehm said the judge's determination that Edwards' schizophrenia made him incapable of defending himself seemed "at a minimum, reasonable." But, Boehm said, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that "competency to represent oneself at trial is measured by competency to stand trial."
Criminal defendants may be ruled competent to stand trial if they understand the proceedings and are capable of assisting their lawyer. The justices said they will consider in the Edwards case whether states may impose a higher standard for measuring a defendant's competency to be his own lawyer than when determining he is competent to stand trial. Arguments probably will take place in March.
The court recently saw an aspect of this dilemma in the case of Scott Panetti, a mentally ill killer from Texas who was nonetheless judged competent to stand trial and allowed to represent himself.
Panetti was convicted and sentenced to death after personally arguing that only an insane person could prove the insanity defense. He dressed in cowboy clothing and submitted an initial witness list that included Jesus Christ and John F. Kennedy. The court blocked his execution in June, in a ruling that did not address his role in his own defense.
The new case is Indiana v. Edwards, 07-208."
http://www.statesman.com/search/content/shared-gen/ap/US_Supreme_Court/Scotus_Self_Representation.html
"The Supreme Court said Friday it will review whether a defendant who is judged competent to stand trial has the right to be his own lawyer, even if he has a history of serious mental illness.
Ahmad Edwards was convicted of attempted murder and other charges in 2005 following a shooting at an Indianapolis department store in 1999.
He was initially found to be schizophrenic and suffering from delusions and spent most of the five years following the shooting in state psychiatric facilities. But by 2005, he was judged competent to stand trial.
Edwards asked to represent himself, but a judge denied the request because he was concerned that Edwards' trial would not be fair. Edwards, represented by a lawyer, was convicted anyway and sentenced to 30 years in prison.
He appealed and Indiana courts agreed that his right to represent himself had been violated, citing a U.S. high court decision from 1993. The courts overturned his conviction and ordered a new trial.
State Supreme Court Justice Theodore Boehm said the judge's determination that Edwards' schizophrenia made him incapable of defending himself seemed "at a minimum, reasonable." But, Boehm said, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that "competency to represent oneself at trial is measured by competency to stand trial."
Criminal defendants may be ruled competent to stand trial if they understand the proceedings and are capable of assisting their lawyer. The justices said they will consider in the Edwards case whether states may impose a higher standard for measuring a defendant's competency to be his own lawyer than when determining he is competent to stand trial. Arguments probably will take place in March.
The court recently saw an aspect of this dilemma in the case of Scott Panetti, a mentally ill killer from Texas who was nonetheless judged competent to stand trial and allowed to represent himself.
Panetti was convicted and sentenced to death after personally arguing that only an insane person could prove the insanity defense. He dressed in cowboy clothing and submitted an initial witness list that included Jesus Christ and John F. Kennedy. The court blocked his execution in June, in a ruling that did not address his role in his own defense.
The new case is Indiana v. Edwards, 07-208."
http://www.statesman.com/search/content/shared-gen/ap/US_Supreme_Court/Scotus_Self_Representation.html
Thursday, October 4, 2007
New Article Regarding Competency to Be Executed
Here's an abstract from a new article that appears in Psychiatric Services, a journal of the American Psychiatric Association:
"Law & Psychiatry: Death Row Delusions: When Is a Prisoner Competent to Be Executed?"
Paul S. Appelbaum, M.D.
This column examines a recent U.S. Supreme Court decision in Panetti v.Quarterman, which embraced a broader view of what makes death row prisoners incompetent to be executed. Although the defendant understood that he was to be executed and the state's purported reason for seeking his death--two criteria suggested by the Court's 1986 decision in Ford v. Wainwright--he suffered from a fixed delusion about the actual reason for his death. The Court indicated that competent prisoners must have a "rational understanding"of the reason that a death penalty is being imposed but declined to define a clear standard.
You can purchase the article for $15 online at:
http://psychservices.psychiatryonline.org/cgi/content/abstract/58/10/1258
American Psychiatric Association Psychiatr Serv 58:1258-1260, October 2007
"Law & Psychiatry: Death Row Delusions: When Is a Prisoner Competent to Be Executed?"
Paul S. Appelbaum, M.D.
This column examines a recent U.S. Supreme Court decision in Panetti v.Quarterman, which embraced a broader view of what makes death row prisoners incompetent to be executed. Although the defendant understood that he was to be executed and the state's purported reason for seeking his death--two criteria suggested by the Court's 1986 decision in Ford v. Wainwright--he suffered from a fixed delusion about the actual reason for his death. The Court indicated that competent prisoners must have a "rational understanding"of the reason that a death penalty is being imposed but declined to define a clear standard.
You can purchase the article for $15 online at:
http://psychservices.psychiatryonline.org/cgi/content/abstract/58/10/1258
American Psychiatric Association Psychiatr Serv 58:1258-1260, October 2007
Wednesday, August 15, 2007
Fifth Circuit Remands Panetti Case
Today, August 15, 2007, the U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals remanded the case of Scott Panetti to the District Court for the Western District of Texas "for further proceedings consistent with the opinion of the Supreme Court." The Supreme Court had overturned the Fifth Circuit's decision to allow Panetti's execution to proceed, ruling that it had used “an improperly restrictive test” in determining that his severe delusions did not render him incompetent to be executed.
The U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals, which considers cases from Texas, Louisiana, and Alabama, has never found a death row inmate incompetent for execution.
http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/unpub/04/04-70045.0.wpd.pdf
The U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals, which considers cases from Texas, Louisiana, and Alabama, has never found a death row inmate incompetent for execution.
http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/unpub/04/04-70045.0.wpd.pdf
Thursday, July 12, 2007
Scott Panetti: Sane Enough to Execute?
July 13, 2007
Austin Chronicle
Scott Panetti: Sane Enough to Execute?
BY JORDAN SMITH
http://www.austinchronicle.com/gyrobase/Issue/story?oid=501928
The U.S. Supreme Court's June 28 ruling in the case of Texas death row inmate Scott Panetti concludes that the law requires that condemned inmates have some "rational understanding" of why they're being executed in order to satisfy the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishments. The court left open a single, significant question: Is Scott Panetti sane enough to die?
Writing for the 5-4 majority, Justice Anthony Kennedy opined that the Texas courts and the 5th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals' handling of the Panetti case was "flawed" and "too restrictive" to satisfy the Eighth Amendment. In deeming him sane enough to be killed, the courts considered only that Panetti "is aware that he committed the murders," that he is "aware that he will be executed," and that he is "aware that the reason the State has given for the execution is his commission of the crimes in question." But according to Panetti, the state's reason for killing him is merely a cover story intended to stop him from preaching "the gospel of the Lord King."
That is irrelevant, says Clarence Thomas, writing for the conservative, four-justice dissent. The state owes Panetti nothing more that it has already provided. "While Panetti's mental illness may make him a sympathetic figure, state and federal courts have repeatedly held that he is competent to face the consequences of the two murders he committed," Thomas wrote. Therefore, this case "should be simple," Thomas wrote. It "must be dismissed." Given Panetti's background and the procedural history of his case, one has to wonder if Thomas is at least equally addled – if not more so – than the death row denizen he so easily disregards.
Panetti was convicted and sentenced to death for the 1992 murder of his in-laws, Joe and Amanda Alvarado, at their home in Fredericksburg. A diagnosed schizophrenic, Panetti previously had been hospitalized at least 11 times, last released from the hospital just two months before he killed the Alvarados. When he turned himself in to police that day, he told authorities that "Sarge" – a recurring auditory hallucination – was responsible for the murders.
In September 1994, a heavily medicated Panetti was deemed competent to be tried for the slayings, and Kerr Co. District Judge Stephen Ables allowed Panetti to represent himself at trial. Panetti wore a purple cowboy outfit to court, filed numerous rambling legal motions, and sought to subpoena nearly 200 witnesses – including Jesus Christ and Anne Bancroft. The trial was "truly a judicial farce and a mockery of self-representation," Panetti's standby attorney later said.
Panetti was convicted, each of his appeals was denied, and Judge Ables scheduled his execution for Feb. 5, 2004. Panetti's attorney filed a motion with the court claiming Panetti's mental illness rendered him incompetent to face execution. Ables denied the motion, but the federal district court ordered that he reconsider. Ables appointed two mental-health experts to assess Panetti's mental state; in April 2004, the experts concluded that Panetti's "uncooperative and bizarre" behavior was actually a sham and that he had "the ability to understand the reason he is to be executed." Ables refused to consider the defense's request for an evidentiary hearing and closed the case. Panetti's lawyers – now including Austin appellate whiz Keith Hampton – appealed. In September 2004, federal District Judge Sam Sparks called the state's handling of the case "constitutionally inadequate" but ultimately ruled against Panetti, noting that the 5th Circuit's "test for competency to be executed requires [that Panetti] know no more than the fact of his impending execution and the factual predicate for the execution."
The Supremes now say that the 5th Circuit's standard is not good enough. "The … standard treats a prisoner's delusional belief system as irrelevant if the prisoner knows that the State has identified his crimes as the reason for his execution," Kennedy wrote. There is nothing in the law to "indicate that delusions are irrelevant to 'comprehen[sion]' or 'aware[ness]' if they so impair the prisoner's concept of reality that he cannot reach a rational understanding of the reason for the execution," he wrote.
Appearing before the high court in March, Texas Solicitor General Ted Cruz argued not only that the 5th Circuit's standard was sufficient but also that Panetti didn't have standing to appeal. In his initial habeas appeal, Panetti failed to claim he would be incompetent to face execution, Cruz argued; moreover, the federal district court (and, ultimately, the Supremes) failed to offer deference to the Texas courts, which have consistently deemed Panetti competent. In his dissenting opinion, Thomas agreed. In Thomas' opinion, the state courts had "more than satisfied" their legal obligation to Panetti. Panetti's insistence that he is too crazy to die, Thomas opined, is nothing more than an "abuse" of federal habeas law.
Kennedy shoots down each argument and offers a harsh rebuke to the Texas courts and, specifically, to Judge Ables. No "deference is due" to the state courts, he wrote, because the courts failed to do anything but rubber-stamp the initial competency determination. Further, Kennedy opined, Panetti could not argue his incompetence to be executed until an actual execution date had been set – otherwise, he noted, every lawyer would be forced to waste court time and resources on the off-chance that her client may at some point in the future be deemed too deluded to execute.
Ultimately, Kennedy wrote, the courts must find a way to determine whether an inmate has a rational understanding of why he is to die. It is a question of retribution vs. spite: "[I]t might be said that capital punishment is imposed because it has the potential to make the offender recognize at last the gravity of his crime and to allow the community as a whole … to affirm its own judgment that the culpability of the prisoner is so serious that the ultimate penalty must be sought and imposed," Kennedy wrote. "The potential for a prisoner's recognition of the severity of the offense and the objective of community vindication are called in question, however, if the prisoner's mental state is so distorted by a mental illness that his awareness of the crime and punishment has little or no relation to the understanding of those concepts shared by the community as a whole."
Panetti's case will return to federal district court, where Judge Sparks will be asked to decide whether Panetti is, in fact, sane enough to die.
Copyright © 2007 Austin Chronicle Corporation. All rights reserved.
Austin Chronicle
Scott Panetti: Sane Enough to Execute?
BY JORDAN SMITH
http://www.austinchronicle.com/gyrobase/Issue/story?oid=501928
The U.S. Supreme Court's June 28 ruling in the case of Texas death row inmate Scott Panetti concludes that the law requires that condemned inmates have some "rational understanding" of why they're being executed in order to satisfy the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishments. The court left open a single, significant question: Is Scott Panetti sane enough to die?
Writing for the 5-4 majority, Justice Anthony Kennedy opined that the Texas courts and the 5th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals' handling of the Panetti case was "flawed" and "too restrictive" to satisfy the Eighth Amendment. In deeming him sane enough to be killed, the courts considered only that Panetti "is aware that he committed the murders," that he is "aware that he will be executed," and that he is "aware that the reason the State has given for the execution is his commission of the crimes in question." But according to Panetti, the state's reason for killing him is merely a cover story intended to stop him from preaching "the gospel of the Lord King."
That is irrelevant, says Clarence Thomas, writing for the conservative, four-justice dissent. The state owes Panetti nothing more that it has already provided. "While Panetti's mental illness may make him a sympathetic figure, state and federal courts have repeatedly held that he is competent to face the consequences of the two murders he committed," Thomas wrote. Therefore, this case "should be simple," Thomas wrote. It "must be dismissed." Given Panetti's background and the procedural history of his case, one has to wonder if Thomas is at least equally addled – if not more so – than the death row denizen he so easily disregards.
Panetti was convicted and sentenced to death for the 1992 murder of his in-laws, Joe and Amanda Alvarado, at their home in Fredericksburg. A diagnosed schizophrenic, Panetti previously had been hospitalized at least 11 times, last released from the hospital just two months before he killed the Alvarados. When he turned himself in to police that day, he told authorities that "Sarge" – a recurring auditory hallucination – was responsible for the murders.
In September 1994, a heavily medicated Panetti was deemed competent to be tried for the slayings, and Kerr Co. District Judge Stephen Ables allowed Panetti to represent himself at trial. Panetti wore a purple cowboy outfit to court, filed numerous rambling legal motions, and sought to subpoena nearly 200 witnesses – including Jesus Christ and Anne Bancroft. The trial was "truly a judicial farce and a mockery of self-representation," Panetti's standby attorney later said.
Panetti was convicted, each of his appeals was denied, and Judge Ables scheduled his execution for Feb. 5, 2004. Panetti's attorney filed a motion with the court claiming Panetti's mental illness rendered him incompetent to face execution. Ables denied the motion, but the federal district court ordered that he reconsider. Ables appointed two mental-health experts to assess Panetti's mental state; in April 2004, the experts concluded that Panetti's "uncooperative and bizarre" behavior was actually a sham and that he had "the ability to understand the reason he is to be executed." Ables refused to consider the defense's request for an evidentiary hearing and closed the case. Panetti's lawyers – now including Austin appellate whiz Keith Hampton – appealed. In September 2004, federal District Judge Sam Sparks called the state's handling of the case "constitutionally inadequate" but ultimately ruled against Panetti, noting that the 5th Circuit's "test for competency to be executed requires [that Panetti] know no more than the fact of his impending execution and the factual predicate for the execution."
The Supremes now say that the 5th Circuit's standard is not good enough. "The … standard treats a prisoner's delusional belief system as irrelevant if the prisoner knows that the State has identified his crimes as the reason for his execution," Kennedy wrote. There is nothing in the law to "indicate that delusions are irrelevant to 'comprehen[sion]' or 'aware[ness]' if they so impair the prisoner's concept of reality that he cannot reach a rational understanding of the reason for the execution," he wrote.
Appearing before the high court in March, Texas Solicitor General Ted Cruz argued not only that the 5th Circuit's standard was sufficient but also that Panetti didn't have standing to appeal. In his initial habeas appeal, Panetti failed to claim he would be incompetent to face execution, Cruz argued; moreover, the federal district court (and, ultimately, the Supremes) failed to offer deference to the Texas courts, which have consistently deemed Panetti competent. In his dissenting opinion, Thomas agreed. In Thomas' opinion, the state courts had "more than satisfied" their legal obligation to Panetti. Panetti's insistence that he is too crazy to die, Thomas opined, is nothing more than an "abuse" of federal habeas law.
Kennedy shoots down each argument and offers a harsh rebuke to the Texas courts and, specifically, to Judge Ables. No "deference is due" to the state courts, he wrote, because the courts failed to do anything but rubber-stamp the initial competency determination. Further, Kennedy opined, Panetti could not argue his incompetence to be executed until an actual execution date had been set – otherwise, he noted, every lawyer would be forced to waste court time and resources on the off-chance that her client may at some point in the future be deemed too deluded to execute.
Ultimately, Kennedy wrote, the courts must find a way to determine whether an inmate has a rational understanding of why he is to die. It is a question of retribution vs. spite: "[I]t might be said that capital punishment is imposed because it has the potential to make the offender recognize at last the gravity of his crime and to allow the community as a whole … to affirm its own judgment that the culpability of the prisoner is so serious that the ultimate penalty must be sought and imposed," Kennedy wrote. "The potential for a prisoner's recognition of the severity of the offense and the objective of community vindication are called in question, however, if the prisoner's mental state is so distorted by a mental illness that his awareness of the crime and punishment has little or no relation to the understanding of those concepts shared by the community as a whole."
Panetti's case will return to federal district court, where Judge Sparks will be asked to decide whether Panetti is, in fact, sane enough to die.
Copyright © 2007 Austin Chronicle Corporation. All rights reserved.
Monday, July 9, 2007
The Wrong Place to Treat Mental Illness
The Wrong Place to Treat Mental Illness
By Marcia Kraft Goin
Washington Post
Sunday, July 8, 2007; Page B07
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/07/06/AR2007070601930.html
Last month the Supreme Court rightly blocked the execution of Scott Panetti, a Texas man who was convicted of a double murder and who suffers from delusional schizophrenia. The case drew public attention to the intersection between mental illnesses and executions.
But what about those who are mentally ill and imprisoned but not on death row? A national conversation on this issue is urgently needed.
There is a pervasive attitude in this country that such people are getting what they deserve: After all, like Panetti, they are in jail for something.
But did you know that the Los Angeles County Jail houses the largest psychiatric population in the country? That's not justice. That's emblematic of a national emergency.
Before the 1960s, people with mental illnesses were generally cared for in institutional settings, mostly state-run psychiatric facilities. Many advocates correctly saw this as "warehousing" people who could be cared for in less restrictive settings. Federal legislation and the courts powered a move toward deinstitutionalization, calling on states and counties to provide resources for social services, vocational rehabilitation and treatment services. The introduction of effective antipsychotic medications also drove the trend toward deinstitutionalization.
In the decades since, community-based services have helped many people. But the situation today constitutes a national failure.
What's gone wrong?
Most important, the necessary community resources didn't materialize in anywhere near the level that was needed. Also, antipsychotic medications, while powerful treatments, don't work in isolation. Patients need a relationship with a psychiatrist, clinic or other stabilizing force to ensure adherence to drug regimens and achieve the best possible recovery.
Deinstitutionalization has succeeded in decreasing the overall number of hospital beds, but an unforeseen consequence has been the proportional increase in the number of people with mental illnesses housed in the criminal justice system. Worse, once imprisoned, people with mental illness are shown to have much longer incarcerations than other inmates, primarily because a prison environment and lack of treatment aggravate the very illness that has led to their objectionable or antisocial behavior.
While no one would argue that Scott Panetti belongs on the streets, his case compels us to consider the justice system's role: Is it to mete out punishment that seeks retribution, or are there cases where real justice means effective treatment that seeks rehabilitation?
Consider again Los Angeles County: In 2002 there were 38,600 psychiatric evaluations at the inmate reception center of the Twin Towers jail. Of these, 23,190 people (60 percent) were found to be in need of mental health treatment. A reasonable person could not fail to see the correlation between decreased funding for mental health resources, the closure of hospital beds, homelessness and the criminalization of mental illnesses. Untreated and lacking access to long-term care, people with mental illnesses often end up with symptoms and behaviors that result in jail time.
Cuts in state Medicaid budgets promise to exacerbate these problems. Not only is this shift in funding a blight on our society, it also costs money -- a lot of money. Corrections officials, mental health workers, medication, amortization of buildings and time spent by police in court all cost more than treating patients appropriately in their community. This doesn't make financial sense, much less humanitarian sense.
When considering the direction of public policies that affect those with mental illnesses, politicians and other officials must be guided by the latest research.
Government-funded studies have shown in recent years that jail-diversion programs, which help people get the treatment they need, result in positive outcomes for individuals, communities and the criminal justice system. While jail diversion does generally result in lower criminal-justice costs and greater treatment costs, studies are underway to analyze the differential.
The question the court answered in the Panetti case was about one's fitness to be executed, but in many more cases, the question is about the appropriateness of incarceration at all.
***
The writer is a past president of the American Psychiatric Association and director of residency training in the Psychiatric Outpatient Department at Los Angeles County General Hospital/University of Southern California School of Medicine.
By Marcia Kraft Goin
Washington Post
Sunday, July 8, 2007; Page B07
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/07/06/AR2007070601930.html
Last month the Supreme Court rightly blocked the execution of Scott Panetti, a Texas man who was convicted of a double murder and who suffers from delusional schizophrenia. The case drew public attention to the intersection between mental illnesses and executions.
But what about those who are mentally ill and imprisoned but not on death row? A national conversation on this issue is urgently needed.
There is a pervasive attitude in this country that such people are getting what they deserve: After all, like Panetti, they are in jail for something.
But did you know that the Los Angeles County Jail houses the largest psychiatric population in the country? That's not justice. That's emblematic of a national emergency.
Before the 1960s, people with mental illnesses were generally cared for in institutional settings, mostly state-run psychiatric facilities. Many advocates correctly saw this as "warehousing" people who could be cared for in less restrictive settings. Federal legislation and the courts powered a move toward deinstitutionalization, calling on states and counties to provide resources for social services, vocational rehabilitation and treatment services. The introduction of effective antipsychotic medications also drove the trend toward deinstitutionalization.
In the decades since, community-based services have helped many people. But the situation today constitutes a national failure.
What's gone wrong?
Most important, the necessary community resources didn't materialize in anywhere near the level that was needed. Also, antipsychotic medications, while powerful treatments, don't work in isolation. Patients need a relationship with a psychiatrist, clinic or other stabilizing force to ensure adherence to drug regimens and achieve the best possible recovery.
Deinstitutionalization has succeeded in decreasing the overall number of hospital beds, but an unforeseen consequence has been the proportional increase in the number of people with mental illnesses housed in the criminal justice system. Worse, once imprisoned, people with mental illness are shown to have much longer incarcerations than other inmates, primarily because a prison environment and lack of treatment aggravate the very illness that has led to their objectionable or antisocial behavior.
While no one would argue that Scott Panetti belongs on the streets, his case compels us to consider the justice system's role: Is it to mete out punishment that seeks retribution, or are there cases where real justice means effective treatment that seeks rehabilitation?
Consider again Los Angeles County: In 2002 there were 38,600 psychiatric evaluations at the inmate reception center of the Twin Towers jail. Of these, 23,190 people (60 percent) were found to be in need of mental health treatment. A reasonable person could not fail to see the correlation between decreased funding for mental health resources, the closure of hospital beds, homelessness and the criminalization of mental illnesses. Untreated and lacking access to long-term care, people with mental illnesses often end up with symptoms and behaviors that result in jail time.
Cuts in state Medicaid budgets promise to exacerbate these problems. Not only is this shift in funding a blight on our society, it also costs money -- a lot of money. Corrections officials, mental health workers, medication, amortization of buildings and time spent by police in court all cost more than treating patients appropriately in their community. This doesn't make financial sense, much less humanitarian sense.
When considering the direction of public policies that affect those with mental illnesses, politicians and other officials must be guided by the latest research.
Government-funded studies have shown in recent years that jail-diversion programs, which help people get the treatment they need, result in positive outcomes for individuals, communities and the criminal justice system. While jail diversion does generally result in lower criminal-justice costs and greater treatment costs, studies are underway to analyze the differential.
The question the court answered in the Panetti case was about one's fitness to be executed, but in many more cases, the question is about the appropriateness of incarceration at all.
***
The writer is a past president of the American Psychiatric Association and director of residency training in the Psychiatric Outpatient Department at Los Angeles County General Hospital/University of Southern California School of Medicine.
U.S. Supreme Court Rules in Favor of Scott Panetti
On June 28, 2007, in a 5-4 decision, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in favor of severely mentally ill death row inmate Scott Panetti and blocked his execution. The court questioned the value of executing a person who does not comprehend why he is being put to death. You can find the opinion (written by Justice Kennedy) at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/opinions/06pdf/06-6407.pdf. You can find more information about Scott Panetti and watch a short documentary about his case on the Texas Defender Service (TDS) website: http://www.texasdefender.org/. Additional information also is available from The Justice Project: http://www.thejusticeproject.org/press/releases/panetti-briefs.html.
StandDown Texas has posted all of the national and state-based media coverage of the Panetti decision. Go to http://standdown.typepad.com/.
Read the response from the National Alliance on Mental Illness (NAMI).
***
So what happens now to Scott Panetti? Well, the justices found that a lower federal appeals court had improperly interpreted Supreme Court precedent when they decided Panetti was sane enough to be executed. They said the 5th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in New Orleans used "an improperly restrictive test" to uphold the finding of competence. (The 5th Circuit Court of Appeals had said it didn’t matter what Panetti believed as long as he could acknowledge the murders as well as the stated purpose of his execution.) The Supreme Court decision sends the case back to a federal district judge to hold a hearing as to whether Panetti’s delusions are indeed so severe that he cannot make the connection between his crime and punishment and should be spared.
Here's more from the Wall Street Journal (June 29, 2007): "In the opinion, Justice Kennedy said 'gross delusions stemming from a severe mental disorder may put an awareness of a link between a crime and its punishment in a context so far removed from reality that the punishment can serve no proper purpose.' While Thursday's ruling continues a trend in which the Court has limited the imposition of the death penalty on defendants with limited intellectual capacity or maturity levels, it didn't address the rising issue of the influx of mentally ill defendants in the criminal justicesystem and on death row. In the opinion, Justice Kennedy stated as much, saying: 'we do not attempt to set down a rule governing all competency determinations.'"
***
At least 20 individuals have been executed by the state of Texas, despite documented histories of paranoid schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, and other severe mental illnesses; many were denied treatment before the commission of their crimes. Still others with mental illness continue to languish on death row, waiting, like Scott Panetti, to be found “competent to execute.” The 5th Circuit has never found a death row inmate incompetent for execution.
StandDown Texas has posted all of the national and state-based media coverage of the Panetti decision. Go to http://standdown.typepad.com/.
Read the response from the National Alliance on Mental Illness (NAMI).
***
So what happens now to Scott Panetti? Well, the justices found that a lower federal appeals court had improperly interpreted Supreme Court precedent when they decided Panetti was sane enough to be executed. They said the 5th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in New Orleans used "an improperly restrictive test" to uphold the finding of competence. (The 5th Circuit Court of Appeals had said it didn’t matter what Panetti believed as long as he could acknowledge the murders as well as the stated purpose of his execution.) The Supreme Court decision sends the case back to a federal district judge to hold a hearing as to whether Panetti’s delusions are indeed so severe that he cannot make the connection between his crime and punishment and should be spared.
Here's more from the Wall Street Journal (June 29, 2007): "In the opinion, Justice Kennedy said 'gross delusions stemming from a severe mental disorder may put an awareness of a link between a crime and its punishment in a context so far removed from reality that the punishment can serve no proper purpose.' While Thursday's ruling continues a trend in which the Court has limited the imposition of the death penalty on defendants with limited intellectual capacity or maturity levels, it didn't address the rising issue of the influx of mentally ill defendants in the criminal justicesystem and on death row. In the opinion, Justice Kennedy stated as much, saying: 'we do not attempt to set down a rule governing all competency determinations.'"
***
At least 20 individuals have been executed by the state of Texas, despite documented histories of paranoid schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, and other severe mental illnesses; many were denied treatment before the commission of their crimes. Still others with mental illness continue to languish on death row, waiting, like Scott Panetti, to be found “competent to execute.” The 5th Circuit has never found a death row inmate incompetent for execution.
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