That's the title of a new posting on the blog Women in Crime Ink, by Lucy Puryear, M.D.:
"On June 19, 2008, the Supreme Court of the U.S. issued a decision in which it held that a higher standard must be used to determine defendants' competence to represent themselves in criminal cases than the test used to determine the accuseds' competence to stand trial. Plainly speaking, this means that while a mentally ill defendant can be found competent to stand trial it does not necessarily follow that they can competently represent themselves as their own counsel.
Fundamentally this could be viewed as a negative decision for the mentally ill. One of our constitutional rights is self-representation in court. We are allowed to tell our story the way we want it told and to plead our case in a manner that we believe is in our own best interest. Now most of us would do a pretty terrible job of maneuvering ourselves through a court case, but sometimes taking your lawyers advice doesn't turn out as you'd hoped. I have heard defendants ask, 'Why didn't my lawyer do this, or why didn't they say that?' Sometimes juries will express, 'Why didn't we hear from the defendant, I want to hear his version of the story.' Not speaking for yourself is not always the right decision.
It becomes very complicated in a case where the defendant is floridly psychotic (hearing voices, speaking in gibberish). Nothing useful will come from that defendant trying to conduct his own trial. The court process becomes derailed and nothing good is accomplished for either the defense or the prosecution. Often the defendant by his very mental state convicts himself with little effort by the prosecution.
But does it make sense to allow someone to be competent to stand trial and yet too ill to represent themselves? Most courtrooms are all too ready to allow a mentally ill defendant to be tried. Recently the Supreme Court of the United States said yes in the Indiana v. Edwards decision.
In July 1999, Ahmad Edwards was discovered trying to steal a pair of shoes from an Indiana department store. After being discovered, he fired a gun at a store security officer and wounded a bystander. He was charged with attempted murder, battery with a deadly weapon, criminal recklessness and theft. He was diagnosed with schizophrenia and subsequently found incompetent to stand trial and was committed to a state psychiatric hospital for further evaluation and treatment. His competency and mental status fluctuated over the course of five years and he was not found competent to proceed to trial until July 2004.
In June 2005, Edwards stood trial. He asked to represent himself but the trial court rejected this request and the jury found him guilty of criminal recklessness and theft but failed to reach a verdict on the charges of attempted murder and battery. The State decided to retry him on the attempted murder and battery charges and he was retried in December 2005. The trial court again found that he was competent to stand trial but not competent to represent himself.
Despite being represented by counsel at his retrial, the jury convicted him on both counts. Edwards appealed, arguing that he had been wrongfully deprived of his constitutional right to represent himself. The case eventually reached the Supreme Court, which addressed the legal question of whether the standard for allowing defendants to represent themselves at trial should be higher than the standard for finding defendants competent to stand trial.
The Court decided that there was a higher standard for representing yourself than the standard for competency. To be found competent to stand trial you must be able to consult with your attorney with a 'reasonable degree of rational understanding.' This means in general that you are able to know what you have been charged with, be able to consult in formulating your own defense, and be able to explain the nature of the pleas involved. (In an interesting aside, Andrea Yates was found competent to stand trial although she initially wanted to plead guilty so that she would be executed by the state which was the only entity who could kill Satan inside of her. She understood the plea but her psychosis was unable to initially allow her to follow her lawyer's advice.)
The Edwards decision states that to be competent to represent yourself you must have the ability for 'organization of defense, making motions, arguing points of law . . . questioning witnesses and addressing the court and jury.' The court is stating that those that are mentally ill may be well enough be found competent but still not be able to represent themselves. While this may appear to be taking away the rights from persons with a disability it may be ultimately in their best legal defense. The Court also comments on the humaneness of the decision, 'A right of self-representation at trial will not affirm the dignity of a defendant who lacks the mental capacity to conduct his defense without the assistance of counsel,' Justice Stephen G. Breyer wrote. 'To the contrary, given that defendant's uncertain mental state, the spectacle that could well result from his self-representation at trial is at least as likely to prove humiliating as ennobling.'
The United States has long struggled with the treatment of the mentally ill. From locking them up in sanitariums for years to locking them up in jails. No one knows quite what to do with the mentally ill defendant who, although it may be obvious that they've committed a crime, it's also obvious that they are seriously disturbed. In Houston alone it is estimated that some 50% of the inmates in the juvenile justice system are seriously and chronically mentally ill. Jail is not a great treatment for a psychiatric disorder.
Texas in particular has struggled with the death penalty and the mentally ill criminal. We have had a history of executing those with known, documented, and profound psychotic illness. This is an embarrassment for our state and a terrible example for respecting human rights. This ruling by the United States Supreme Court is a very small step forward in assuring that those who commit crimes and are suffering from mental illness have both their rights protected and receive fair trails [sic]. What to do with a mentally ill defendant after conviction is the topic of another blog. I look forward to sharing my thoughts on a very complicated issue."
***
Showing posts with label Self-Representation. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Self-Representation. Show all posts
Monday, August 25, 2008
Monday, June 23, 2008
Coverage of the Indiana v. Edwards Decision
The New York Times has this coverage of last week's U.S. Supreme Court decision in the case of Indiana v. Edwards ("Self-Representation by the Mentally Ill Is Curbed," June 20, 2008):
"A mentally ill defendant who is nonetheless competent to stand trial is not necessarily competent to dispense with a lawyer and represent himself, the Supreme Court ruled on Thursday.
The court said that judges could 'take realistic account of the particular defendant’s mental capacities' and, in the interest of achieving a fair trial, deny the constitutional right to self-representation that criminal defendants ordinarily enjoy.
The 7-to-2 decision overturned a ruling by the Indiana Supreme Court that had found that a schizophrenic man was entitled to a new trial on a charge of attempted murder because the trial judge had improperly denied his request to represent himself.
The defendant, Ahmad Edwards, who was sometimes quite coherent and at other times decidedly not so, had differed with his lawyer over defense strategy. He wanted to argue self-defense, while his lawyer wanted to present a defense based on lack of intent.
Mr. Edwards had fired a gun at a department store security officer after trying to steal a pair of shoes. He was found competent to stand trial after two psychiatric hospitalizations over three years after the shooting.
A landmark Supreme Court decision in 1975, Faretta v. California, established the right to self-representation as a basic constitutional right.
Writing for the majority on Thursday, Justice Stephen G. Breyer said the question in this case was answered neither by the Faretta decision, which did not involve a competency issue, nor by a subsequent decision that permitted a mentally ill defendant to waive the right to counsel and plead guilty.
Conducting a defense at trial without a lawyer’s help requires a higher degree of competence, Justice Breyer said.
Noting that the court has referred to the right to self-representation as an aspect of individual dignity, Justice Breyer said dignity was lacking in the 'spectacle that could well result' from a mentally ill defendant’s efforts, which he said were 'at least as likely to prove humiliating as ennobling.'
Justice Breyer said that rather than setting an all-encompassing definition of competency, the court would leave the decision to individual trial judges, who he said 'will often prove best able to make more fine-tuned mental capacity decisions, tailored to the individual circumstances of a particular defendant.'
Indiana had asked the court simply to overrule the Faretta decision, which Justice Breyer has criticized. But he said 'recent empirical research' indicated that the decision was not, in fact, leading to unfair trials when defendants were mentally competent.
The decision, Indiana v. Edwards, No. 07-208, drew a vigorous dissenting opinion from Justice Antonin Scalia, joined by Justice Clarence Thomas. Justice Scalia said the treatment Mr. Edwards received in being denied to present the defense of his choice 'seems to me the epitome of both actual and apparent unfairness.'
The only reason the court has previously accepted as valid for denying self-representation, Justice Scalia said, was a threat to the orderliness ofthe trial. But Mr. Edwards was 'respectful and compliant' and did not even have the chance to try representing himself, Justice Scalia continued, adding, 'The dignity at issue is the supreme human dignity of being master of one’s fate rather than a ward of the state — the dignity of individual choice.'
Justice Scalia said that 'trial judges will have every incentive to make their lives easier' by appointing lawyers rather than giving mentally ill defendantsa chance to proceed on their own.
'In singling out mentally ill defendants for this treatment,' he said, 'the court’s opinion does not even have the questionable virtue of being politically correct.'"
And here's an excerpt from an analysis provided by Lyle Denniston, with scotusblog ("Faretta survives, with limits," June 19, 2008):
"The Edwards opinion by Breyer, in dealing with mentally ill individuals who voice a desired to be their own defense counsel, provides one clear implication, and one quite unclear prospect.
It is clear, simply from the result, that states may now have one standard of mentally competency for putting a mentally impaired person on trial, and a higher standard that such a person would have to meet in order to be allowed self-representation. Ahmad Edwards had been found competent to be put on trial, but not to represent himself.
What is unclear, though, is what the higher standard is for representing one’s self when mental competency is at issue. The Court expressly rejected a proposal by the state of Indiana that self-representation be denied whenever the accused 'cannot communicate coherently with the court or a jury.' The state had suggested that approach, saying it 'fits Sixth Amendment doctrine, which allows some balancing of interests when defendants attempt self-representation.'
In fact, the state argued, if the Court did not adopt some such standard, that would be a reason to cast Faretta aside.
The Court said no to that approach: 'We are sufficiently uncertain…as to how that particular standard would work in practice to refrain from endorsing it as a federal constitutional standard here. We need not now, and we do not, adopt it.'
To which Scalia replied in dissent: 'Today’s holding is extraordinarily vague. The Court does not accept Indiana’s position that self-representation can be denied ‘where the defendant cannot communicate coherently with the court or a jury.'…It does not even hold that Edwards was properly denied his right to represent himself. It holds only that lack of mental competence can under some circumstances form a basis for denying the right to proceed pro se…We will probably give some meaning to this holding in the future, but the indeterminancy makes a bad holding worse.'
In other words, there will have to be sequels. In the meantime, states can experiment with various formulations of a standard — so long as it is not theone Indiana suggested."
***
Additional coverage is available in The Washington Post and the Legal Times, and from the Associated Press.
"A mentally ill defendant who is nonetheless competent to stand trial is not necessarily competent to dispense with a lawyer and represent himself, the Supreme Court ruled on Thursday.
The court said that judges could 'take realistic account of the particular defendant’s mental capacities' and, in the interest of achieving a fair trial, deny the constitutional right to self-representation that criminal defendants ordinarily enjoy.
The 7-to-2 decision overturned a ruling by the Indiana Supreme Court that had found that a schizophrenic man was entitled to a new trial on a charge of attempted murder because the trial judge had improperly denied his request to represent himself.
The defendant, Ahmad Edwards, who was sometimes quite coherent and at other times decidedly not so, had differed with his lawyer over defense strategy. He wanted to argue self-defense, while his lawyer wanted to present a defense based on lack of intent.
Mr. Edwards had fired a gun at a department store security officer after trying to steal a pair of shoes. He was found competent to stand trial after two psychiatric hospitalizations over three years after the shooting.
A landmark Supreme Court decision in 1975, Faretta v. California, established the right to self-representation as a basic constitutional right.
Writing for the majority on Thursday, Justice Stephen G. Breyer said the question in this case was answered neither by the Faretta decision, which did not involve a competency issue, nor by a subsequent decision that permitted a mentally ill defendant to waive the right to counsel and plead guilty.
Conducting a defense at trial without a lawyer’s help requires a higher degree of competence, Justice Breyer said.
Noting that the court has referred to the right to self-representation as an aspect of individual dignity, Justice Breyer said dignity was lacking in the 'spectacle that could well result' from a mentally ill defendant’s efforts, which he said were 'at least as likely to prove humiliating as ennobling.'
Justice Breyer said that rather than setting an all-encompassing definition of competency, the court would leave the decision to individual trial judges, who he said 'will often prove best able to make more fine-tuned mental capacity decisions, tailored to the individual circumstances of a particular defendant.'
Indiana had asked the court simply to overrule the Faretta decision, which Justice Breyer has criticized. But he said 'recent empirical research' indicated that the decision was not, in fact, leading to unfair trials when defendants were mentally competent.
The decision, Indiana v. Edwards, No. 07-208, drew a vigorous dissenting opinion from Justice Antonin Scalia, joined by Justice Clarence Thomas. Justice Scalia said the treatment Mr. Edwards received in being denied to present the defense of his choice 'seems to me the epitome of both actual and apparent unfairness.'
The only reason the court has previously accepted as valid for denying self-representation, Justice Scalia said, was a threat to the orderliness ofthe trial. But Mr. Edwards was 'respectful and compliant' and did not even have the chance to try representing himself, Justice Scalia continued, adding, 'The dignity at issue is the supreme human dignity of being master of one’s fate rather than a ward of the state — the dignity of individual choice.'
Justice Scalia said that 'trial judges will have every incentive to make their lives easier' by appointing lawyers rather than giving mentally ill defendantsa chance to proceed on their own.
'In singling out mentally ill defendants for this treatment,' he said, 'the court’s opinion does not even have the questionable virtue of being politically correct.'"
And here's an excerpt from an analysis provided by Lyle Denniston, with scotusblog ("Faretta survives, with limits," June 19, 2008):
"The Edwards opinion by Breyer, in dealing with mentally ill individuals who voice a desired to be their own defense counsel, provides one clear implication, and one quite unclear prospect.
It is clear, simply from the result, that states may now have one standard of mentally competency for putting a mentally impaired person on trial, and a higher standard that such a person would have to meet in order to be allowed self-representation. Ahmad Edwards had been found competent to be put on trial, but not to represent himself.
What is unclear, though, is what the higher standard is for representing one’s self when mental competency is at issue. The Court expressly rejected a proposal by the state of Indiana that self-representation be denied whenever the accused 'cannot communicate coherently with the court or a jury.' The state had suggested that approach, saying it 'fits Sixth Amendment doctrine, which allows some balancing of interests when defendants attempt self-representation.'
In fact, the state argued, if the Court did not adopt some such standard, that would be a reason to cast Faretta aside.
The Court said no to that approach: 'We are sufficiently uncertain…as to how that particular standard would work in practice to refrain from endorsing it as a federal constitutional standard here. We need not now, and we do not, adopt it.'
To which Scalia replied in dissent: 'Today’s holding is extraordinarily vague. The Court does not accept Indiana’s position that self-representation can be denied ‘where the defendant cannot communicate coherently with the court or a jury.'…It does not even hold that Edwards was properly denied his right to represent himself. It holds only that lack of mental competence can under some circumstances form a basis for denying the right to proceed pro se…We will probably give some meaning to this holding in the future, but the indeterminancy makes a bad holding worse.'
In other words, there will have to be sequels. In the meantime, states can experiment with various formulations of a standard — so long as it is not theone Indiana suggested."
***
Additional coverage is available in The Washington Post and the Legal Times, and from the Associated Press.
Thursday, June 19, 2008
U.S. Supreme Court Places Limits on Self-Representation
The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled in Indiana v. Edwards that defendants with severe mental illness who are found competent to stand trial do not necessarily have the right to represent themselves. The Court heard arguments in the case earlier this spring.
Here's a quick summary from Associated Press reporter Mark Sherman ("Court puts limits on mentally ill defendants," June 19, 2008):
"The Supreme Court ruled Thursday that criminal defendants with a history of mental illness do not always have the right to represent themselves, even if they have been judged competent to stand trial.
The justices, by a 7-2 vote, said states can give trial judges discretion to prevent someone from acting as his own lawyer if they are concerned that the trial could turn into a farce.
The decision comes in the case of an Indiana man who was convicted of attempted murder and other charges in 2005 for a shooting six years earlier at an Indianapolis department store.
Ahmad Edwards was initially found to be schizophrenic and suffering from delusions and spent most of the five years after the shooting in state psychiatric facilities. But by 2005, he was judged competent to stand trial.
Edwards asked to represent himself. A judge denied the request because he was concerned that Edwards' trial would not be fair. Edwards, represented by a lawyer, was convicted anyway and sentenced to 30 years in prison.
He appealed, and Indiana courts agreed that his right to represent himself had been violated, citing a U.S. high court decision from 1993. The courts overturned his conviction and ordered a new trial.
Thursday's ruling probably will lead to the reinstatement of the conviction.
'The Constitution permits states to insist upon representation by counsel for those competent enough to stand trial ... but who still suffer from severe mental illness to the point where they are not competent to conduct trial proceedings by themselves,' Justice Stephen Breyer wrote in the majority opinion.
Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas dissented. 'In my view, the Constitution does not permit a state to substitute its own perception of fairness for the defendant's right to make his own case before the jury,' Scalia said.
***
The opinion is available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/opinions/07pdf/07-208.pdf.
Earlier coverage of Indiana v. Edwards is available here, here, here, and here.
Here's a quick summary from Associated Press reporter Mark Sherman ("Court puts limits on mentally ill defendants," June 19, 2008):
"The Supreme Court ruled Thursday that criminal defendants with a history of mental illness do not always have the right to represent themselves, even if they have been judged competent to stand trial.
The justices, by a 7-2 vote, said states can give trial judges discretion to prevent someone from acting as his own lawyer if they are concerned that the trial could turn into a farce.
The decision comes in the case of an Indiana man who was convicted of attempted murder and other charges in 2005 for a shooting six years earlier at an Indianapolis department store.
Ahmad Edwards was initially found to be schizophrenic and suffering from delusions and spent most of the five years after the shooting in state psychiatric facilities. But by 2005, he was judged competent to stand trial.
Edwards asked to represent himself. A judge denied the request because he was concerned that Edwards' trial would not be fair. Edwards, represented by a lawyer, was convicted anyway and sentenced to 30 years in prison.
He appealed, and Indiana courts agreed that his right to represent himself had been violated, citing a U.S. high court decision from 1993. The courts overturned his conviction and ordered a new trial.
Thursday's ruling probably will lead to the reinstatement of the conviction.
'The Constitution permits states to insist upon representation by counsel for those competent enough to stand trial ... but who still suffer from severe mental illness to the point where they are not competent to conduct trial proceedings by themselves,' Justice Stephen Breyer wrote in the majority opinion.
Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas dissented. 'In my view, the Constitution does not permit a state to substitute its own perception of fairness for the defendant's right to make his own case before the jury,' Scalia said.
***
The opinion is available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/opinions/07pdf/07-208.pdf.
Earlier coverage of Indiana v. Edwards is available here, here, here, and here.
Thursday, March 27, 2008
Coverage of Arguments in Indiana v. Edwards
Oral arguments in the U.S. Supreme Court case of Indiana v. Edwards took place yesterday, March 27, 2008. According to scotusblog, "The core issue in Indiana v. Edwards (07-208) is whether states are constitutionally free to require that accused individuals have a higher level of mental capacity to represent themselves than is required for them simply to be put on trial with a lawyer at their side. As the lawyer for the state pressed for a two-level standard, most of the Court reacted with skepticism, first, about how to define a workable two-level test, and, second, about how that would complicate actua ltrials. Underlying much of the oral argument was a deep perplexity over how to conduct fair trials for persons with sub-standard mental capacity."
Read the full analysis from scotusblog.
Here's an excerpt from the New York Times ("Court Looks at Legal Role for Mentally Ill"):
"Addressing the justices, the Indiana solicitor general, Thomas M. Fisher, said the judge was 'justified in requiring a higher level of competency for self-representation in order to prevent the trial of Ahmad Edwards from descending into a farce.'
Justice Antonin Scalia, the member of the court who takes the broadest view of various rights under the Sixth Amendment, challenged Mr. Fisher to explain why the judge could not have waited to see how Mr. Edwards would actually handle himself.
'By waiting to see if in fact he will turn the trial into a farce,' Justice Scalia said, 'you avoid the risk of depriving him of his right to represent himself, which is certainly a very important constitutional right.'
Justice Scalia had a similar exchange with Michael R. Dreeben, a deputy United States solicitor general, who argued for the federal government on Indiana's behalf. Mr. Dreeben said the court should not adhere to a rigid rule that would 'force the state to have the train wreck occur when the evidence is very firm and reliable that it will occur.'
He said the state's interest lay in 'starting the trial from the beginning in a coherent and orderly way and not subjecting the defendant to the risk of an unfair trial based on the defendant's own incompetence.'
Justice Stephen G. Breyer was among the justices most sympathetic to the state's argument. Defendants representing themselves 'do surprisingly well,' Justice Breyer said, citing a study noted in a brief filed by the American Psychiatric Association. But, he added, 'there is a small subclass' of defendants who fare badly on their own.
Why not have 'a rule which permitted a state to deal with this subclass of disturbed people who want to represent themselves?' Justice Breyer asked Mark T. Stancil, the lawyer for Mr. Edwards. 'This is a perfect instance where the states should experiment.' Mr. Stancil replied that such an approach 'undermines the fundamental premise of the Sixth Amendment, which is it's his defense.'
He offered examples of his client's evident understanding of the proceedings. That provoked a dismissive comment from Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, who said, 'There are all kinds of nuts who could get 90 percent on the bar exam.'
The standard for competence to stand trial, formulated in a 1960 Supreme Court decision, Dusky v. United States, is fairly basic. It requires that a defendant have 'sufficient present ability to consult with lawyer with areasonable degree of rational understanding' and a 'rational as well as a factual understanding of the proceedings against him.'
Mr. Fisher, the Indiana solicitor general, said the standard for competency to represent oneself should require more, 'that it is within the state's authority to override this right where the defendant cannot communicate coherently with the court or the jury.'
To that, Justice Scalia responded: 'Cannot communicate coherently? I sometimes think that the lawyers cannot communicate coherently.'"
Additional coverage of the case is available from these media outlets:
Washington Post
Legal Times
Associated Press
USA Today
Indianopolis Star
National Public Radio ("Day to Day")
A transcript of the oral arguments is available at: http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/07-208.pdf.
Read the full analysis from scotusblog.
Here's an excerpt from the New York Times ("Court Looks at Legal Role for Mentally Ill"):
"Addressing the justices, the Indiana solicitor general, Thomas M. Fisher, said the judge was 'justified in requiring a higher level of competency for self-representation in order to prevent the trial of Ahmad Edwards from descending into a farce.'
Justice Antonin Scalia, the member of the court who takes the broadest view of various rights under the Sixth Amendment, challenged Mr. Fisher to explain why the judge could not have waited to see how Mr. Edwards would actually handle himself.
'By waiting to see if in fact he will turn the trial into a farce,' Justice Scalia said, 'you avoid the risk of depriving him of his right to represent himself, which is certainly a very important constitutional right.'
Justice Scalia had a similar exchange with Michael R. Dreeben, a deputy United States solicitor general, who argued for the federal government on Indiana's behalf. Mr. Dreeben said the court should not adhere to a rigid rule that would 'force the state to have the train wreck occur when the evidence is very firm and reliable that it will occur.'
He said the state's interest lay in 'starting the trial from the beginning in a coherent and orderly way and not subjecting the defendant to the risk of an unfair trial based on the defendant's own incompetence.'
Justice Stephen G. Breyer was among the justices most sympathetic to the state's argument. Defendants representing themselves 'do surprisingly well,' Justice Breyer said, citing a study noted in a brief filed by the American Psychiatric Association. But, he added, 'there is a small subclass' of defendants who fare badly on their own.
Why not have 'a rule which permitted a state to deal with this subclass of disturbed people who want to represent themselves?' Justice Breyer asked Mark T. Stancil, the lawyer for Mr. Edwards. 'This is a perfect instance where the states should experiment.' Mr. Stancil replied that such an approach 'undermines the fundamental premise of the Sixth Amendment, which is it's his defense.'
He offered examples of his client's evident understanding of the proceedings. That provoked a dismissive comment from Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, who said, 'There are all kinds of nuts who could get 90 percent on the bar exam.'
The standard for competence to stand trial, formulated in a 1960 Supreme Court decision, Dusky v. United States, is fairly basic. It requires that a defendant have 'sufficient present ability to consult with lawyer with areasonable degree of rational understanding' and a 'rational as well as a factual understanding of the proceedings against him.'
Mr. Fisher, the Indiana solicitor general, said the standard for competency to represent oneself should require more, 'that it is within the state's authority to override this right where the defendant cannot communicate coherently with the court or the jury.'
To that, Justice Scalia responded: 'Cannot communicate coherently? I sometimes think that the lawyers cannot communicate coherently.'"
Additional coverage of the case is available from these media outlets:
Washington Post
Legal Times
Associated Press
USA Today
Indianopolis Star
National Public Radio ("Day to Day")
A transcript of the oral arguments is available at: http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/07-208.pdf.
Wednesday, March 26, 2008
Op-Ed on the Issue of Self Representation
Jonathan Turley, a professor of law at George Washington University, comments on the Ahmad Edwards case (Indiana v. Edwards) in an op-ed that appeared today in the Los Angeles Times ("A fool and his lawyer," March 26, 2008). He too cites the case of Scott Panetti to illustrate the tremendous harm that can result when defendants' with severe mental illness are allowed to represent themselves.
Much of the commentary on the Edwards case thus far has focused on the low standards for competency to stand trial. According to Chapter 46B of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure:
“(a) A person is incompetent to stand trial if the person does not have:
1. sufficient present ability to consult with the person’s lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding; or
2. a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against the person.
(b) A defendant is presumed competent to stand trial and shall be found competent to stand trial unless proved incompetent by a preponderance of the evidence.”
Competency relates to a defendant’s mental state at the time of trial, not at the time of the alleged crime. Incompetency is not a defense to the crime charged. Evidence that a defendant is suffering from a mental illness is not enough to establish that he or she is incompetent to stand trial.
Here are excerpts from Turley's op-ed:
"Less than 1% of felony prisoners represent themselves. Many do great harm to their own cases and suffer the consequences of such self-inflicted wounds. There are also costs to others. When Colin Ferguson killed six passengers and injured 19 others on the Long Island Rail Road in 1993, for example, he insisted on representing himself despite the clear evidence that he was a delusional psychopath. Yet he was deemed fit to stand trial under the extremely low standard of competency. The resulting bizarre trial mixed moments of mental clarity with total fantasies of mistaken identifies. Victims were forced to be cross-examined by the man who shot them as he tried toconvince them that they saw someone else on the train. He was found guilty.
In a case in Texas in 1995, Scott Louis Panetti was treated as competent for trial and proceeded to represent himself in his murder case. He was a lunatic who dressed as a cowboy in court, tried to subpoena Jesus and clearly traumatized his estranged wife, Sonja, in a cross-examination that forced her to relive the murders of her parents. A jury convicted Panetti in 90 minutes. (The Supreme Court in 1997 stayed his execution on insanity grounds.) [Ed. Note: The Court stayed his execution in 2007, not 1997.]
Notably, his treating psychiatrist, Dr. F.E. Seale, asked the most poignant question after Panetti's conviction: 'My God, how in the world can our legal system allow an insane man to defend himself?'
The answer can be found not in the twisted minds of these defendants but in our own twisted legal standards. We have been manipulating 'competence' for years to guarantee that mentally ill individuals can be tried. After John W. Hinckley Jr. was found not guilty by reason of insanity in the assassination attempt on President Reagan in 1981, enraged politicians ripped up existing insanity laws and replaced them with standards so low that even the most clearly insane defendants, such as Andrea Yates, who killed her five children in Texas in 2001, would be viewed as entirely competent to stand trial.
When these same individuals then invoke their right to self-representation, however, we are caught in a trap of our own making.
Obviously, we are embarrassed when the people we seek to execute or imprison are so mentally incompetent that they make a farce out of a proceeding. Thus, judges seek ways to find them sane enough to execute or imprison -- but incompetent to argue their own cases. This is what happened in the case of Zacarias Moussaoui, who proved to be a barking lunatic before his terrorism trial. The court found him competent to stand trial but denied him the right to represent himself. (His appeal of that decision is pending in the U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals.)
There are relatively few major cases of self-representation, and most, like the Panetti and Edwards cases, would have been avoided by simply recognizing the defendants' incompetence to stand trial in the first place.
Rather than address the ridiculously low standard for competence to stand trial, many now want the Supreme Court to raise the standard for self-representation. But by imposing skill and educational requirements, courts could force many defendants to have others speak for them while they are expected to pay the costs of any resulting verdict.
If we insist on ignoring the mental illness of our defendants, then we should live with the untidy and unpleasant results.
Read the op-ed in its entirety.
Much of the commentary on the Edwards case thus far has focused on the low standards for competency to stand trial. According to Chapter 46B of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure:
“(a) A person is incompetent to stand trial if the person does not have:
1. sufficient present ability to consult with the person’s lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding; or
2. a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against the person.
(b) A defendant is presumed competent to stand trial and shall be found competent to stand trial unless proved incompetent by a preponderance of the evidence.”
Competency relates to a defendant’s mental state at the time of trial, not at the time of the alleged crime. Incompetency is not a defense to the crime charged. Evidence that a defendant is suffering from a mental illness is not enough to establish that he or she is incompetent to stand trial.
Here are excerpts from Turley's op-ed:
"Less than 1% of felony prisoners represent themselves. Many do great harm to their own cases and suffer the consequences of such self-inflicted wounds. There are also costs to others. When Colin Ferguson killed six passengers and injured 19 others on the Long Island Rail Road in 1993, for example, he insisted on representing himself despite the clear evidence that he was a delusional psychopath. Yet he was deemed fit to stand trial under the extremely low standard of competency. The resulting bizarre trial mixed moments of mental clarity with total fantasies of mistaken identifies. Victims were forced to be cross-examined by the man who shot them as he tried toconvince them that they saw someone else on the train. He was found guilty.
In a case in Texas in 1995, Scott Louis Panetti was treated as competent for trial and proceeded to represent himself in his murder case. He was a lunatic who dressed as a cowboy in court, tried to subpoena Jesus and clearly traumatized his estranged wife, Sonja, in a cross-examination that forced her to relive the murders of her parents. A jury convicted Panetti in 90 minutes. (The Supreme Court in 1997 stayed his execution on insanity grounds.) [Ed. Note: The Court stayed his execution in 2007, not 1997.]
Notably, his treating psychiatrist, Dr. F.E. Seale, asked the most poignant question after Panetti's conviction: 'My God, how in the world can our legal system allow an insane man to defend himself?'
The answer can be found not in the twisted minds of these defendants but in our own twisted legal standards. We have been manipulating 'competence' for years to guarantee that mentally ill individuals can be tried. After John W. Hinckley Jr. was found not guilty by reason of insanity in the assassination attempt on President Reagan in 1981, enraged politicians ripped up existing insanity laws and replaced them with standards so low that even the most clearly insane defendants, such as Andrea Yates, who killed her five children in Texas in 2001, would be viewed as entirely competent to stand trial.
When these same individuals then invoke their right to self-representation, however, we are caught in a trap of our own making.
Obviously, we are embarrassed when the people we seek to execute or imprison are so mentally incompetent that they make a farce out of a proceeding. Thus, judges seek ways to find them sane enough to execute or imprison -- but incompetent to argue their own cases. This is what happened in the case of Zacarias Moussaoui, who proved to be a barking lunatic before his terrorism trial. The court found him competent to stand trial but denied him the right to represent himself. (His appeal of that decision is pending in the U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals.)
There are relatively few major cases of self-representation, and most, like the Panetti and Edwards cases, would have been avoided by simply recognizing the defendants' incompetence to stand trial in the first place.
Rather than address the ridiculously low standard for competence to stand trial, many now want the Supreme Court to raise the standard for self-representation. But by imposing skill and educational requirements, courts could force many defendants to have others speak for them while they are expected to pay the costs of any resulting verdict.
If we insist on ignoring the mental illness of our defendants, then we should live with the untidy and unpleasant results.
Read the op-ed in its entirety.
More on Self Representation
Here's more on the case of Ahmad Edwards, from the National Law Journal (March 17, 2008, "Right to counsel probed by justices"). The U.S. Supreme Court is hearing arguments on the case today.
"Ahmad Edwards was arrested in July 1999 when, after resisting apprehension by a security guard for shoplifting shoes, he drew and fired a gun, injuring an onlooker.
During the next five years, courts found him not competent to stand trial and ordered treatment for his psychosis until 2004, when he was found competent.
At trial and at a later retrial, Edwards sought to represent himself. Although the trial court found his waiver of his right to counsel to be timely, knowing and voluntary - as required by Supreme Court decisions - it rejected his requests. The court concluded that his long history of delusions, schizophrenia, communications problems and related problems made him incapable of self-representation. Edwards was then tried with court-appointed counsel, convicted and sentenced to 30 years.
The Indiana Supreme Court reversed Edwards' convictions. While expressing sympathy for the trial judge's reasoning and the state's arguments, the court said that the U.S. Supreme Court had held in two cases that the standard for competency to represent oneself can be nothing more than competency to stand trial. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975); Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S.389 (1993).
In the high court, Indiana Solicitor General Thomas Fisher argues that the Sixth Amendment right to self-representation is not absolute.
Faretta and its progeny, he argues, allow courts to counterbalance the demand for self-representation with the need to preserve a fair trial.
For example, Fisher notes, courts may impose counsel on disruptive defendants, and standby counsel on any defendant who seeks self-representation.
Indiana, he said, proposes a 'clear communication rule' in self-representation demands. 'A trial court may deny a criminal defendant the right to represent himself at trial where the defendant cannot communicate coherently with the court or a jury,' he said.
If this court finds this proposed rule inconsistent with Faretta, Fisher argues, the court should consider overruling Faretta, because 'as the dissenting opinions of Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun in Faretta make clear, a right to self representation is without solid textual, structural, or historical foundation.'
Supporting Indiana, the Criminal Justice Foundation's [Kent] Scheidegger said, 'States should have some leeway [in these types of cases] and not have to walk a tightrope where a little tilt in either direction tips you over the edge.'
Under the current rule, he said, appellate courts can find reversible error whichever way a judge rules.
States here are not seeking to regulate the Sixth Amendment right, but to extinguish it for a particular class of people, said Edwards' high court counsel, Mark T. Stancil of Washington's Robbins, Russell, Englert, Orseck, Untereiner & Sauber.
If the prospect of prosecuting an impaired defendant, he said, offends a state's sense of fairness, it can raise its standard for competency to stand trial.
Faretta made clear that the Sixth Amendment protects the defendant's choice to proceed pro se. The states, he said, want the high court to give them the choice of imposing a higher standard, of deciding which defendants can exercise the right and which cannot, even when a defendant has the capacity to make the decision.
'There is so much greater potential for strategic manipulation when states can make that choice,' said Stancil.
'At the end of the day, we think the Sixth Amendment is about defendants' rights. Whether it makes it harder or easier for the state to prosecute cases is beyond the point.'
The NACDL (National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers), in support of neither party, asks the court to step back from its rule that the standard for competency to stand trial is the same for competency to self-represent, and instead return to the common law standard.
'If someone has counsel, the question should be whether that person can assist counsel,' said Kevin Martin of Boston's Goodwin Procter. 'But if there is no counsel, ask if the defendant is competent to go forward on his own. If someone is not competent to represent himself, you no longer have to ask, 'Can we force counsel on him?' because he doesn't go to trial in the first place."'
It is a 'very complicated' issue, added Martin, noting that the competency standard is almost a half-century old 'and we still struggle with it.'"
"Ahmad Edwards was arrested in July 1999 when, after resisting apprehension by a security guard for shoplifting shoes, he drew and fired a gun, injuring an onlooker.
During the next five years, courts found him not competent to stand trial and ordered treatment for his psychosis until 2004, when he was found competent.
At trial and at a later retrial, Edwards sought to represent himself. Although the trial court found his waiver of his right to counsel to be timely, knowing and voluntary - as required by Supreme Court decisions - it rejected his requests. The court concluded that his long history of delusions, schizophrenia, communications problems and related problems made him incapable of self-representation. Edwards was then tried with court-appointed counsel, convicted and sentenced to 30 years.
The Indiana Supreme Court reversed Edwards' convictions. While expressing sympathy for the trial judge's reasoning and the state's arguments, the court said that the U.S. Supreme Court had held in two cases that the standard for competency to represent oneself can be nothing more than competency to stand trial. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975); Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S.389 (1993).
In the high court, Indiana Solicitor General Thomas Fisher argues that the Sixth Amendment right to self-representation is not absolute.
Faretta and its progeny, he argues, allow courts to counterbalance the demand for self-representation with the need to preserve a fair trial.
For example, Fisher notes, courts may impose counsel on disruptive defendants, and standby counsel on any defendant who seeks self-representation.
Indiana, he said, proposes a 'clear communication rule' in self-representation demands. 'A trial court may deny a criminal defendant the right to represent himself at trial where the defendant cannot communicate coherently with the court or a jury,' he said.
If this court finds this proposed rule inconsistent with Faretta, Fisher argues, the court should consider overruling Faretta, because 'as the dissenting opinions of Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun in Faretta make clear, a right to self representation is without solid textual, structural, or historical foundation.'
Supporting Indiana, the Criminal Justice Foundation's [Kent] Scheidegger said, 'States should have some leeway [in these types of cases] and not have to walk a tightrope where a little tilt in either direction tips you over the edge.'
Under the current rule, he said, appellate courts can find reversible error whichever way a judge rules.
States here are not seeking to regulate the Sixth Amendment right, but to extinguish it for a particular class of people, said Edwards' high court counsel, Mark T. Stancil of Washington's Robbins, Russell, Englert, Orseck, Untereiner & Sauber.
If the prospect of prosecuting an impaired defendant, he said, offends a state's sense of fairness, it can raise its standard for competency to stand trial.
Faretta made clear that the Sixth Amendment protects the defendant's choice to proceed pro se. The states, he said, want the high court to give them the choice of imposing a higher standard, of deciding which defendants can exercise the right and which cannot, even when a defendant has the capacity to make the decision.
'There is so much greater potential for strategic manipulation when states can make that choice,' said Stancil.
'At the end of the day, we think the Sixth Amendment is about defendants' rights. Whether it makes it harder or easier for the state to prosecute cases is beyond the point.'
The NACDL (National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers), in support of neither party, asks the court to step back from its rule that the standard for competency to stand trial is the same for competency to self-represent, and instead return to the common law standard.
'If someone has counsel, the question should be whether that person can assist counsel,' said Kevin Martin of Boston's Goodwin Procter. 'But if there is no counsel, ask if the defendant is competent to go forward on his own. If someone is not competent to represent himself, you no longer have to ask, 'Can we force counsel on him?' because he doesn't go to trial in the first place."'
It is a 'very complicated' issue, added Martin, noting that the competency standard is almost a half-century old 'and we still struggle with it.'"
Tuesday, March 25, 2008
Should Inmates with Severe Mental Illness Be Allowed to Represent Themselves?
Tomorrow, March 26, the U.S. Supreme Court will consider the case of Ahmad Edwards, a man with a history of mental illness who was found competent to stand trial but was not allowed to represent himself as he requested. Numerous death penalty cases have involved issues related to competency to stand trial; the Scott Panetti case in particular (cited in the article below) raises the issue of self representation by those with long histories of mental illness.
Here are excerpts from an article that appeared last week in USA Today ("High court to consider self-representation"):
"When Ahmad Edwards appealed his conviction of attempted murder and other charges, the Indiana Supreme Court agreed Edwards had the right to represent himself and reversed his conviction.
The Indiana attorney general's office appealed, arguing that allowing mentally impaired defendants to represent themselves undermines fair trials and erodes public confidence in the system.
'The consequences often are disastrous for both the defendants and the integrity — not to mention dignity — of the criminal justice system,' the Indiana attorney general's office wrote in its brief to the court.
Indiana's position is backed by the Justice Department, 19 other states and the American Bar Association.
Edwards' lawyer counters that the right to represent oneself gives the defendant power in the relationship with his attorney, and states should not have 'unfettered discretion' to place a higher standard on that right for certain defendants.
Since a 1993 Supreme Court ruling addressed the issue of the competency standards for waiving the right to counsel and pleading guilty, at least 60 legally competent but mentally impaired defendants have tried to represent themselves, according to the state.
In 1995, a Texas man defending himself on capital murder charges tried to subpoena Jesus, wore a cowboy outfit to court, and assumed an alternative personality when testifying.
In another case, Colin Ferguson was convicted in 1995 of killing six passengers on the Long Island Railroad after representing himself with the unsuccessful argument that someone else took the gun from his bag and shot the passengers.
Erica Hashimoto, a University of Georgia law school professor who conducted the first comprehensive study of felony defendants who chose to represent themselves, said they represent significantly less than 1% of all felony defendants. About 20% of the federal felony defendants she examined showed signs of mental illness.
And while there are different ways of determining the success of defendants representing themselves in state and federal courts, the bottom line is 'they certainly did not lose all of their cases at trial,' she said.
'To the extent that the states are worried about too many people representing themselves who are mentally ill, I think that's a product of the fact that our standard for competency to stand trial is so low,' she said. 'Once we say a defendant is competent to stand trial, I think it's dangerous to say that he is entitled to less rights than another defendant.' ..."
and
"The Supreme Court said in the 1975 case Faretta v. California that defendants have a constitutional right to waive counsel at trial if doing so voluntarily and intelligently.
In the 1993 case Godinez v. Moran, the court said the standard for determining competency to stand trial — whether the defendant can understand the proceedings and assist in his defense — is the same standard for waiving the right to counsel and pleading guilty.
Indiana argues that some courts have interpreted that decision to mean that the self-representation standard can't be lower than competency to stand trial, but it can be higher.
In Wisconsin, for example, the state Supreme Court has said trial judges can deny self-representation based on the defendant's education, literacy, fluency in English as well as physical or psychological disabilities.
Edwards' lawyer said Indiana is exaggerating the split in the courts on the issue, and the Supreme Court has already settled that it's the defendant's choice, not his skill, that determines self-representation."
Read the full article.
Here are excerpts from an article that appeared last week in USA Today ("High court to consider self-representation"):
"When Ahmad Edwards appealed his conviction of attempted murder and other charges, the Indiana Supreme Court agreed Edwards had the right to represent himself and reversed his conviction.
The Indiana attorney general's office appealed, arguing that allowing mentally impaired defendants to represent themselves undermines fair trials and erodes public confidence in the system.
'The consequences often are disastrous for both the defendants and the integrity — not to mention dignity — of the criminal justice system,' the Indiana attorney general's office wrote in its brief to the court.
Indiana's position is backed by the Justice Department, 19 other states and the American Bar Association.
Edwards' lawyer counters that the right to represent oneself gives the defendant power in the relationship with his attorney, and states should not have 'unfettered discretion' to place a higher standard on that right for certain defendants.
Since a 1993 Supreme Court ruling addressed the issue of the competency standards for waiving the right to counsel and pleading guilty, at least 60 legally competent but mentally impaired defendants have tried to represent themselves, according to the state.
In 1995, a Texas man defending himself on capital murder charges tried to subpoena Jesus, wore a cowboy outfit to court, and assumed an alternative personality when testifying.
In another case, Colin Ferguson was convicted in 1995 of killing six passengers on the Long Island Railroad after representing himself with the unsuccessful argument that someone else took the gun from his bag and shot the passengers.
Erica Hashimoto, a University of Georgia law school professor who conducted the first comprehensive study of felony defendants who chose to represent themselves, said they represent significantly less than 1% of all felony defendants. About 20% of the federal felony defendants she examined showed signs of mental illness.
And while there are different ways of determining the success of defendants representing themselves in state and federal courts, the bottom line is 'they certainly did not lose all of their cases at trial,' she said.
'To the extent that the states are worried about too many people representing themselves who are mentally ill, I think that's a product of the fact that our standard for competency to stand trial is so low,' she said. 'Once we say a defendant is competent to stand trial, I think it's dangerous to say that he is entitled to less rights than another defendant.' ..."
and
"The Supreme Court said in the 1975 case Faretta v. California that defendants have a constitutional right to waive counsel at trial if doing so voluntarily and intelligently.
In the 1993 case Godinez v. Moran, the court said the standard for determining competency to stand trial — whether the defendant can understand the proceedings and assist in his defense — is the same standard for waiving the right to counsel and pleading guilty.
Indiana argues that some courts have interpreted that decision to mean that the self-representation standard can't be lower than competency to stand trial, but it can be higher.
In Wisconsin, for example, the state Supreme Court has said trial judges can deny self-representation based on the defendant's education, literacy, fluency in English as well as physical or psychological disabilities.
Edwards' lawyer said Indiana is exaggerating the split in the courts on the issue, and the Supreme Court has already settled that it's the defendant's choice, not his skill, that determines self-representation."
Read the full article.
Monday, December 10, 2007
Court to Rule on Acting As Own Lawyer
From the Austin-American Statesman, December 7, 2007:
"The Supreme Court said Friday it will review whether a defendant who is judged competent to stand trial has the right to be his own lawyer, even if he has a history of serious mental illness.
Ahmad Edwards was convicted of attempted murder and other charges in 2005 following a shooting at an Indianapolis department store in 1999.
He was initially found to be schizophrenic and suffering from delusions and spent most of the five years following the shooting in state psychiatric facilities. But by 2005, he was judged competent to stand trial.
Edwards asked to represent himself, but a judge denied the request because he was concerned that Edwards' trial would not be fair. Edwards, represented by a lawyer, was convicted anyway and sentenced to 30 years in prison.
He appealed and Indiana courts agreed that his right to represent himself had been violated, citing a U.S. high court decision from 1993. The courts overturned his conviction and ordered a new trial.
State Supreme Court Justice Theodore Boehm said the judge's determination that Edwards' schizophrenia made him incapable of defending himself seemed "at a minimum, reasonable." But, Boehm said, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that "competency to represent oneself at trial is measured by competency to stand trial."
Criminal defendants may be ruled competent to stand trial if they understand the proceedings and are capable of assisting their lawyer. The justices said they will consider in the Edwards case whether states may impose a higher standard for measuring a defendant's competency to be his own lawyer than when determining he is competent to stand trial. Arguments probably will take place in March.
The court recently saw an aspect of this dilemma in the case of Scott Panetti, a mentally ill killer from Texas who was nonetheless judged competent to stand trial and allowed to represent himself.
Panetti was convicted and sentenced to death after personally arguing that only an insane person could prove the insanity defense. He dressed in cowboy clothing and submitted an initial witness list that included Jesus Christ and John F. Kennedy. The court blocked his execution in June, in a ruling that did not address his role in his own defense.
The new case is Indiana v. Edwards, 07-208."
http://www.statesman.com/search/content/shared-gen/ap/US_Supreme_Court/Scotus_Self_Representation.html
"The Supreme Court said Friday it will review whether a defendant who is judged competent to stand trial has the right to be his own lawyer, even if he has a history of serious mental illness.
Ahmad Edwards was convicted of attempted murder and other charges in 2005 following a shooting at an Indianapolis department store in 1999.
He was initially found to be schizophrenic and suffering from delusions and spent most of the five years following the shooting in state psychiatric facilities. But by 2005, he was judged competent to stand trial.
Edwards asked to represent himself, but a judge denied the request because he was concerned that Edwards' trial would not be fair. Edwards, represented by a lawyer, was convicted anyway and sentenced to 30 years in prison.
He appealed and Indiana courts agreed that his right to represent himself had been violated, citing a U.S. high court decision from 1993. The courts overturned his conviction and ordered a new trial.
State Supreme Court Justice Theodore Boehm said the judge's determination that Edwards' schizophrenia made him incapable of defending himself seemed "at a minimum, reasonable." But, Boehm said, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that "competency to represent oneself at trial is measured by competency to stand trial."
Criminal defendants may be ruled competent to stand trial if they understand the proceedings and are capable of assisting their lawyer. The justices said they will consider in the Edwards case whether states may impose a higher standard for measuring a defendant's competency to be his own lawyer than when determining he is competent to stand trial. Arguments probably will take place in March.
The court recently saw an aspect of this dilemma in the case of Scott Panetti, a mentally ill killer from Texas who was nonetheless judged competent to stand trial and allowed to represent himself.
Panetti was convicted and sentenced to death after personally arguing that only an insane person could prove the insanity defense. He dressed in cowboy clothing and submitted an initial witness list that included Jesus Christ and John F. Kennedy. The court blocked his execution in June, in a ruling that did not address his role in his own defense.
The new case is Indiana v. Edwards, 07-208."
http://www.statesman.com/search/content/shared-gen/ap/US_Supreme_Court/Scotus_Self_Representation.html
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